Weekly Highlights 15.09.25 – 21.09.25

15.09.25 – 21.09.25

Israel proposal for security agreements with the Syrian Transitional Government
Israel has proposed a security agreement to Syria that would create three demilitarized zones in southern Syria, each with stricter regulations based on their proximity to the Syria-Israel border. This proposal, submitted to Syrian officials a few weeks ago, outlines the establishment of a no-fly zone for Syrian aircraft that extends into the territory south of Damascus. The primary objective is to secure an air corridor to Iran, facilitating potential future Israeli airstrikes.
Al-Sharaa stated on September 17 that a security agreement with Israel is essential, but it must respect Syria’s airspace and territorial integrity, and include UN supervision. The differences between Israel’s proposal for three demilitarized zones and Syria’s counterproposal, which demands Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territory and the redeployment of a UN observer force, suggest that an agreement is not imminent.
Since Netanyahu’s February 2025 call for the complete demilitarization of southern Syria, the Israeli government has continued to push for this demilitarization by carring out airstrikes against Syrian government forces that have breached the desired zone.
Last week, the Syrian government forces withdrew all “heavy weapons” from southern Syria, relocating them in the north of Damascus.

US diplomats charged of affairs in Syria let go from their position
Recently, several top U.S. diplomats involved in Syrian affairs have been dismissed from their positions. While one U.S. diplomat claimed that these departures would not impact U.S. policy in Syria and were not due to disagreements with Barrack or the White House, another Western diplomat suggested that the ousting was partly driven by differing views between staffers and Barrack regarding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Al-Sharaa.
Barrack, who was appointed last May, has spearheaded a shift in U.S. policy towards supporting a unified Syrian state under Al-Sharaa, who took power after the ousting of Bashar al-Assad late last year. This dismissal coincides with a request from negotiators representing the Autonomous Administration, made two weeks prior, for “international guarantees” from Washington, Paris, and Riyadh to finalize any agreement with the Syrian government.

US, Jordan and STG created a roadmap for Suweida
The Suweida Autonomous Government has rejected a US-Syrian-Jordanian roadmap aimed at resolving intercommunal violence in Suweida Province. The roadmap was announced on September 16. Its stated goals are the guarantee of rights and promotion of societal reconciliation, but it did not include input from anti-government factions in Suweida.
The roadmap proposes security and administrative arrangements and commits the Syrian government to forming an independent commission to investigate crimes in Suweida.
The autonomous government’s judicial committee of Suweida criticized the plan for relying on a “corrupt” Syrian judicial system and viewing the Syrian government as a “neutral party.” The committee, along with its military wing comprising about 40 Druze militias, provides administrative services and security in central, southern, and eastern Suweida, while pro-government forces control the northern and western areas.
In their denunciation, the committee asserted that the violence in July 2025 justified the people of Suweida’s right to self-determination, which could include self-administration or secession from Syria.
The autonomous committee of Suweida’s statements is not the only element opposing the realization of the roadmap: The Druze leaders collaborating with the Syrian transitional government have lost local support since the July massacres, with many viewing them as a traitor.
Additionally, Israeli support for anti-government Druze factions impacts those reconciliation efforts: Israel, answering to calls from Druze leaders for international assistance, has provided arms and salaries to approximately 3,000 anti-government Druze militia members.

Negociations SDF-STG
On September 20, artillery shelling by the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces struck the village of Umm Tina located in the eastern countryside of Aleppo, resulting in the deaths of seven civilians and injuries to four others. In an official statement, the SDF described the incident as a “massacre” against civilians, noting that the attacks began with drones followed by heavy artillery shelling, which directly targeted residents’ homes.
On September 18, an exchange of small arms fire between the MoD forces and the SDF near Aleppo took place. No military casualties have been reported from this engagement. Prior to the exchange, a Turkish drone was observed flying over the area, likely conducting reconnaissance.
The recent involvment of a Turkish drone reconnaissance, is part of the broader increase in military cooperation between Syria and Turkey. On the same day, Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson stated that the Turkish military will remain in Syria to “fight terrorism,” likely refering to the SDF.
While Turkey supports military action against the SDF, Damascus has urged Turkey to delay such operations to provide additional time for negotiations. Al-Sharaa is unlikely to endorse any military action that would destabilize more Syria.

Eviction of 22000 Alawites from Damascus by GSS
Inhabitants of Damascus reported that between August 27 and 29, personnel from the General Security Services (GSS) forcibly evicted approximately 22,000 Alawite residents from the al Somaria neighborhood.
Residents of al Somaria said that GSS members demanded proof of home ownership and marked properties for eviction if such proof was not provided. The GSS justified these evictions by stating that the homes were built on land illegally seized by the Assad regime in the 1970s. This land was originally occupied after the regime forcibly displaced Sunni residents from the Muadamiyat al Sham neighborhood.
Over 200,000 former landowners from Muadamiyat al Sham and their heirs still claim the right to return to their land in al Somaria. Human rights experts stated that the GSS’s actions constitute selective forced evictions, lacking proper notice or alternative housing for those displaced. They argue that successful transitional justice for the evictions perpetuated by the Assad regime must respect the rights of original landowners and cannot be solely determined by the Syrian government.
The policies of the Syrian transitional government concerning Housing, Land, and Property violations in Damascus demonstrate its failure to engage with Syria’s necessary restorative process following Assad’s rule, the civil war, and the extensive displacement resulting from Turkish occupation.