01.12.25 – 07.12.25

Abdullah Ocala proposal for SDF disarmament
On November 24, Abdullah Ocalan proposed a plan for the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to Turkish parliament members engaged in the PKK disarmament dialogue. This plan stipulates that the SDF should join the Syrian military while retaining its own internal security apparatus.
This announcement represents the first call from Ocalan for the SDF to assimilate into the Syrian military structure while preserving its internal security forces. In February 2025, Ocalan asserted that “all [PKK] groups must lay [down] their arms,” a statement interpreted by Turkish officials as a directive for the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian transitional government under the MoD.
SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi asserted that it “applies solely to the PKK [and is not] applicable to our situation in Syria.” Ocalan’s newly articulated vision aligns more closely with Abdi’s advocacy for a decentralized Syrian state, allowing the SDF to maintain local security governance in northeastern Syria.

AKP push for SDF to hand over strategical assets
On December 2, an AKP spokeperson indicated that Turkey may reassess its classification of the SDF as a “terrorist organization,” at the condition that SDF hands over critical resources and infrastructure to the Syrian government as part of its reintegration into the Syrian state.
The spokesperson also stated that the SDF would effectively “cease to be a threat to Turkey and a terrorist organization” if it submits control of strategic assets—including airports, border crossings, and oil fields—to the Syrian government.
This transfer of pivotal resources and infrastructure is a strategic maneuver to undermine the SDF’s influence in NES, as it would restrict it’s access to the Turkish border and curtail its revenue streams from oil operations. Both Turkey and the Syrian government have asserted that the SDF must fully integrate into the Syrian state by year’s end. A potential shift in Turkey’s threat assessment could imply that Turkey may be anticipating the SDF’s adherence to the March 10 agreement.

Suweida National Guard carries out political arrests, killings and torture of prominent Druze figures
On November 28, the Suwayda National Guard executed a series of arrests and killings targeting notable Druze figures within Suweida Province. The Druze militia coalition apprehended ten individuals, accusing them of organizing a “conspiracy” in cooperation with the Syrian transitional government. Among those arrested were several influential figures of the Druze community.
On November 29, members of the Suweida National Guard recorded acts of torture against Sheikh Matni. His corpse, displaying evident signs of torture, was delivered to the entrance of Suweida City Hospital on December 2. Sheikh Matni had played a pivotal role in establishing the Suweida Military Council in February 2025, a Druze militia that confronted transitional government forces amid the intercommunal violence of July 2025. Matni maintained a close relationship with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri; however, tensions arose following Matni’s opposition to Hijri’s initiative to form the Suweida National Guard. Pro-government sources claim that Matni was arrested for advocating a negotiated settlement with the Syrian transitional government.

One year after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad
December 8 will mark one year since the fall of the Assad regime. Many celebrations have already taken place in Syria. On December 6, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) issued a decree forbidding celebrations on the 7th and 8th of the month. The decree stipulated that the decision was made for security reasons, citing the recent rise in terrorist attacks.
While it is true that the recent decision of the Syrian transitional government to join the anti-ISIS coalition has bolstered Islamist group activities, it is likely that the AANES’s decision to forbid celebrations for the first anniversary of the fall of Assad is motivated by a desire to maintain public order. The deadline for the negotiations regarding AANES and SDF integration into the Syrian state is approaching. In these times of tension, the AANES might be attempting to avoid protests that would oppose its governance in Northeast Syria, thereby impacting its capacity to defend its right to autonomy.

Continuous developments:
– Former senior Assad regime officials are funding and equipping clandestine networks in Syria to conduct insurgent activity against the Syrian transitional government. Many of the fighters organized by those senior Assad regime officials are “ghost soldiers,” lacking genuine loyalty and primarily seeking financial support.
– On December 3, the Syrian General Security Service (GSS) confiscated multiple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and various munitions from an ISIS safe house located near Damascus. This operation is part of ongoing counter-ISIS efforts of the syrian government, which have dismantled several ISIS IED manufacturing sites in the region.
– On November 27 and 28, ISIS claimed responsibility for three attacks within Syrian government-controlled territory. This marks the group’s first acknowledgment of attacks in this region since May 2025, likely answering to Syria’s recent decision to join the Global Coalition Against ISIS.

Evaluation – A year after Assad

For a year now, we have been publishing regular reports on the situation in Syria and our assessment of it. Even when you are in the region, it is often difficult to untangle the web of events unfolding there — a year ago, we called it 4D chess. And that is still how it feels today: Syria is the object of interest for many countries of various stripes, each of which is trying to grab its piece of influence, taking advantage of the turbulent situation caused by the fall of Assad’s dictatorial regime.

The balance of power in the region shifted rapidly, with Russia and Iran’s influence virtually disappearing immediately after Damascus was captured by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militants. Now that Syria is ruled by former Al-Nusra militants led by Jolani, the United States has become much more involved in all matters of the state. This is particularly evident when it comes to negotiations: America has taken on the role of ‘facilitator’ in the dialogue between Damascus and north-eastern Syria. Turkey was initially at the center of events, sponsoring the march on Damascus and, taking advantage of the opportunity, directing SNA attacks on the autonomous region.

Syria under Jolani has already suffered enormous losses. Thousands of civilians killed in massacres involving government forces, first on the coast in Latakia and then in the south in Suwayda, were not victims of circumstances, but of the consistent policy of fundamentalists. The new regime did not keep us waiting; it showed its true colors at the very beginning of its formation, but stubbornly continues to publicly adhere to the image of ‘moderate Islam’ that sells well in Western countries.

For north-eastern Syria and the Kurdish liberation movement, this year was historic in its own way. The main event was the dissolution of the PKK, which was accompanied by the withdrawal of guerrillas from the mountains of Bakur. The disarmament ceremony — literally the destruction of weapons — evoked many emotions. It became a symbol of the conclusion of an entire era of revolutionary struggle, not only for Kurdistan but for the whole world. After the announcement of the dissolution, we took a break from publishing analyses and focused directly on the events in order to better understand the situation and avoid jumping to conclusions. This turned out to be for the best: we had the opportunity to study the ideological and strategic aspects of this decision in greater depth and to truly understand the position of the Kurdish liberation movement on these issues, rather than simply broadcasting our assumptions.

Another important topic this year was the negotiations with the new Syrian government and the so-called integration of the SDF into the state’s armed forces. Nobody fully understands how this will work in practice, but the strategic component of this decision is clear. The democratic integration that the Apoist movement talks about is one of the programmatic steps proposed by Abdullah Öcalan in his ‘Manifesto for Peace and Democratic Society.’ In this sense, the SDF is quite consistently following the path it has set out. Such integration does not imply assimilation — autonomy remains autonomy, revolution remains revolution — but it can also provide more opportunities to spread the ideas of democratic confederalism beyond the borders of north-east Syria, and the region itself can overcome the blockade under which it has been since the beginning of the revolution. This is also ideologically consistent for the Apoists: a revolution cannot be built in isolation, freedom on a separate piece of land is not freedom. Everyone must be free.

For now, it does not appear that the agreements reached on 10 March will end with a return to the previous level of military tension, but people here are prepared for any developments. One thing is clear: sooner or later, war will break out again in this region if no other solutions for the coexistence of peoples and states are found. Democratic autonomy has an answer to these questions. Only time will tell how interested the states will be in resolving problems in a way that is goes against state logic.

We are still writing about events in Syria from the ground. For us, this is not only an interesting experiment, a slice of history that can help people outside these territories to better understand what is happening and see events from a different perspective. For us it is a struggle full of contradictions and problems. On every step of this path we face many questions and doubts. Revolution is never perfect. Nevertheless, we decided to be part of it and accept all its risks, challenges and consequences. Thank you for staying with us!

Warmest revolutionary greetings!