13.10.25 – 19.10.25

SDF integration into the new Syrian army
On October 14 and 15, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) officials confirmed the integration of SDF into the new Syrian army, comprising three divisions and several independent brigades located in northeastern Syria (NES). SDF counterterrorism brigades will be deployed all over Syria. The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) will also form a brigade in the new army. Disagreements between Syrian government and SDF officials persist regarding the YPJ’s role in the new structure. On October 7, Mazloum Abdi and Al-Sharaa reached a “preliminary agreement” on military integration, though specifics remain unannounced. An “initial timeline” have been set for this integration by the end of 2025, but it was emphasized that it is not a definitive timeline.

SDF – Syrian government forces joint force to fight ISIS
Mazloum Abdi announced ongoing discussions with Damascus and Washington to establish a joint military force against ISIS. He described this initiative as part of a broader strategy to combat terrorism across Syria.
The commander of the SDF stated, “Washington proposed the creation of a joint force between us and Damascus to fight ISIS, and we have accepted.” He emphasized that the SDF aims to make the fight against ISIS “a comprehensive, nationwide effort.”
Abdi also mentioned that upcoming meetings between SDF and Syrian transitional government military committees will take place in Damascus to discuss coordination mechanisms.

Discussions Turkey – Syrian governement to expand Adana Agreement
On October 17, a Turkish officials stated that discussions are underway to expand the 1998 Adana Agreement, which currently permits Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to five kilometers into Syrian territory, raising the limit to 30 kilometers. Turkey is seeking an agreement with the Syrian government to allow its forces to target SDF fighters deep within Syria and potentially set the stage for future military operations against the SDF.
Expanding the agreement would facilitate Turkey’s operations within the 30-kilometer zone. While it has conducted strikes deeper than this limit in the past, a revised Adana Agreement would support ground pursuits and help mitigate friction with the new Syrian government.
It remains uncertain whether the Syrian government will agree to these terms, as it could jeopardize recent Kurdish cooperation.

Meeting Al Sharaa – Putin
Al-Sharaa met with Vladimir Putin on October 15. Sharaa expressed a desire to “redefine” the Syrian-Russian relationship, emphasizing Russia’s “significant role” in advancing Syria’s political goals. Putin indicated his support for new initiatives, particularly in Syria’s energy sector reconstruction.
The Russia-Syria relationship, evolving since the regime’s fall, now consists of mutually beneficial arrangements. Russia retains military presence at three bases in Syria, and has used economic support to secure its position under Sharaa’s government.
The Syrian government likely seeks military cooperation to gain insights for building a new army, although direct arms supplies from Russia are unlikely due to ongoing needs in Ukraine. Syria also needs economic support to address resource shortages, with Russia providing oil and wheat while discussing future involvement in infrastructure restoration. Furthermore, Syrian officials are likely working to secure Russia’s commitment to stop supporting members of the Assad regime to enhance their legitimacy and advocate for accountability. Engaging Russia may also serve to counterbalance Israel’s presence in southern Syria, with considerations for redeploying Russian military police in the area.

06.10.25 – 12.10.25

Clashes between Asayish and the Government Security Forces in Aleppo
The fighting erupted shortly after the Syrian Government Security Forces (GSS) discovered an alleged Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) tunnel extending from Kurdish areas into a nearby government-controlled neighborhood on October 6. The GSS reacted by sealing off all entrances and exits to Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud. In response to these closures, Kurdish residents staged protests. The GSS repressed them, killing four protesters and injuring many. The same night, clashes erupted between Syrian government forces and Asayish units, lasting for several hours.
On October 7, Mazloum Abdi and two other officials from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria traveled to Damascus for discussions with Al-Sharaa and the Syrian defense minister. Following their meeting, the minister announced an immediate “comprehensive ceasefire on all fronts” in northern and northeastern Syria. Thomas Barrack, who attended the meeting alongside the US Central Command Commander, stated that Al-Sharaa and Mazlum Abdi discussed both sides’ “recommitment” to the March 10 Agreement, indicating that they believe both parties are “heading in the right direction.”
The same day, the Syrian Transitional Government forces broke the ceasefire by bombing the SDF soldiers stationed on the west side of the Tishrin Dam.

SDF Makes New Steps to Join a New Syrian Army
In a ceremony celebrating the 10th anniversary of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi announced on Friday that the SDF will begin formal procedures to join a new Syrian army being established as part of the implementation of the March 10 agreements. He stated, “A military committee will soon travel to Damascus and discuss how the SDF will be integrated.”
Later on, the SDF commander expressed in an interview that the Syrian Transitional Government is showing a positive approach towards the issue of decentralization, noting that discussions are underway regarding amending the constitution and that the Syrian Democratic Forces and Asayish will join the Ministry of Defense. He also called on the people of Afrin to prepare for an organized return. While encouraging, those steps should be approached with caution, as there have been several unsuccessful attempts to achieve this goal in the past months.

Syrian Parliamentary Elections Took Place Without NES and Suweida
On October 5, parliamentary elections were held. They were a parody of democracy: Al-Sharaa has indirectly approved two-thirds of the elected candidates and will directly appoint the remaining members. Women’s representation in the newly elected assembly does not exceed three percent after the counting process. North-Eastern Syria and Suweida Governorate were arbitrarily excluded from the elections. The Syrian government justified this exclusion by citing that the security situation in those regions was too unstable for participation. Until further progress in the negotiations between them and Al-Sharaa’s government, the NES and Suweida seats will remain empty in the parliament. According to the plans set forth by Al-Sharaa’s administration, this assembly will maintain legislative authority until Syria adopts a permanent constitution with new legislative elections.

The National Guard Aims to Regain Control Over Suweida Government-Held Territories
On October 6, the National Guard, a coalition of anti-government Druze militias, stated that they seek to regain control over Suweidawi villages currently occupied by the Syrian Transitional Government. On October 9, the coalition stated that it will wait for a “political solution” from “guarantor states” to regain control of all of Suweida Province. The National Guard did not specify which “guarantor states” it seeks to collaborate with but thanked the United States and Israel for “standing” with Suweida and noted that the National Guard seeks further coordination with Israel. The same day, clashes erupted between Syrian government forces and a Druze armed group in the western part of Suweida Governorate. The National Guard denied any implication in the attack and called on its fighters to remain at their positions and to adhere to the ceasefire agreement.

29.09.25 – 05.10.25

Turkish military reinforcements
Turkish military deployed helicopters, air defenses and SYHK (armored vehicle-launched bridge systems, used to cross rivers) in the Kuweires Airbase, located about 10 kilometers west of the SDF-controlled town of Deir Hafer, which is the westernmost town that the SDF controls in the Aleppo province. The same source indicates that Turkish military also deployed reinforcements to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled towns of Gire Spi and Serekaniye. Such reinforcements can be seen as a way to pressure SDF to accept the integration conditions of the transitional goverment before the end of the year, the deadline agreed in the March 10th agreements.

Clashes in Tishrin and drone strike in tabqa
Armed groups affiliated with the Damascus government carried out heavy shelling on Tishrin Dam and its surroundings using tanks, other heavy weapons and drones. The shelling targeted heavy wepons positions of SDF, hitting some facilities of the Tishrin dam and damaging also civilian buildings of surrounding villages. SDF responded to the attacks with heavy weapons, no casualties reported. Days later, on Sunday, a drone striked SDF positions in the river crossing of Tabqa.

Partial parliamentary elections in Syria
Syria held its first parliamentary elections since the fall of al-Assad’s regime. The voting excluded the regions of Suwayda and the areas run by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and the 19 assigned seats to those regions are expected to remain vacant. Around 6,000 voters from regional electoral bodies were expected to participate, with 1,570 candidates running for office.

Syrian defense officials visit Moscow
An official delegation of defense official of Damascus government visited Moscow, amid an increased number of high-level meetings between Syrian and Russian defense officials in the past month. Such increase may suggest a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations.

Precision strikes of US in Idlib
The international coalition conducted at least two precision strikes on Idlib, targeting high rank salafist militant affiliated with al-Qaeda. In one of them they allegedly killed former Ansar al Islam leader Abu Darda Kurdi.

ISIS attacks on SDF
In its weekly publication al-Nabaa, an ISIS-affiliated outlet, the group announced responsibility for several attacks on SDF, claiming to have killed 11 SDF fighters, wounded 5 others, and destroyed 2 vehicles. They claim that most of their attacks targeted areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to “affirm the steadfastness” of those held in Hol Camp.

22.09.25 – 28.09.25

Al-Sharaa participated in the United Nations General Assembly
On September 24, Al-Sharaa addressed the UN General Assembly. In his speech, he asserted that Syria has shifted from being an “exporter of crises” to a potential source of peace and stability in the region. Al-Sharaa warned of external attempts to “incite sectarian conflict” aimed at destabilizing Syria and emphasized the government’s commitment to justice by establishing independent commissions to investigate past abuses.
Al-Sharaa also affirmed Syria’s dedication to dialogue and diplomacy with Israel, referencing the ongoing negotiations regarding security agreements. He condemned Israeli military operations against Syria, urging the international community to support Syria in addressing these threats. The UN General Assembly also provided the occasion for Al-Sharaa to meet with Trump, Erdogan, and Zelensky.

Meeting Al-Sharaa – Trump
Following the meeting between Trump and Al-Sharaa, various declarations and decisions were made by the Trump administration regarding Syria. The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the ending of the state of emergency associated with Bashar al-Assad’s rule and the lifting of broad-based sanctions. The sanctions framework was redefined as “Sanctions Regulations to Enhance Accountability for Assad and Regional Stability.” This change represents a shift from blanket sanctions to more targeted measures aimed at individuals and networks involved in war crimes, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking, particularly concerning the production and smuggling of captagon.
At the same time, Barrack announced that the formation of an “inclusive central government in Syria” is to be expected before the end of 2025, stressing that the U.S. does not consider federalism a suitable solution to the Syrian crisis. In his declaration, Barrack described the Suweida massacres as “regrettable.” Trump also revealed plans to issue an “important statement” regarding Syria and stated that lifting sanctions on Damascus was aimed at “giving Syrians breathing space” after previously “very strict” restrictions.

Meeting Al-Sharaa – Erdogan
The two presidents met on Wednesday during the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Erdogan restated the “necessity of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) adherence to the March 10 agreement with the Syrian government,” encouraging the Syrian government to increase military and political pressure on the SDF to integrate into Syria. Erdogan added that Turkish support for Syria would “continue to increase.”

Meeting Al-Sharaa – Zelensky
On Wednesday, following a meeting between Al-Sharaa and Zelensky, Ukraine and Syria officially restored diplomatic relations. The two leaders discussed common security threats and areas where Syria and Ukraine can enhance cooperation, which likely includes trade. Although this restoration marks a new phase in the rapprochement between the two countries, it is not the first initiative of its kind. On September 23, Syrian and Ukrainian port and trade officials convened in Damascus to explore ways to enhance their bilateral economic and trade relations. Additionally, during the decline of the Assad regime, the Ukrainian army sought to diminish Russia’s influence in Syria by providing training in drone tactics to the armed forces of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
The restoration of diplomatic relations between Syria and Ukraine also follows an increase in diplomatic contact between Russia and Syria in recent months.

SDF – MoD clashes
On September 23, the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) conducted several drone strikes to disable SDF artillery positions located south of Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province. The drone strike killed one SDF member and injured two others. The attack was followed by hours of MoD artillery shelling that hit civilian-populated areas, injuring four children. The SDF responded by targeting several MoD positions in the area with rocket artillery. In a statement, the SDF described the attacks of the Syrian MoD as “a military escalation aimed at destabilizing the region.”

Security talks between Syria and Israel break down
Negotiations between Syria and Israel regarding security have stalled due to Israel’s demand for a humanitarian corridor connecting Israel to Suweida. Since mid-August 2025, the two countries have been discussing the demilitarization of southwestern Syria, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories captured after the fall of the Assad regime, and the situation of the Druze community in Suweida. They were, according to U.S. representatives, close to finalizing a “de-escalation” agreement until Israel reintroduced its demand for the humanitarian corridor.

15.09.25 – 21.09.25

Israel proposal for security agreements with the Syrian Transitional Government
Israel has proposed a security agreement to Syria that would create three demilitarized zones in southern Syria, each with stricter regulations based on their proximity to the Syria-Israel border. This proposal, submitted to Syrian officials a few weeks ago, outlines the establishment of a no-fly zone for Syrian aircraft that extends into the territory south of Damascus. The primary objective is to secure an air corridor to Iran, facilitating potential future Israeli airstrikes.
Al-Sharaa stated on September 17 that a security agreement with Israel is essential, but it must respect Syria’s airspace and territorial integrity, and include UN supervision. The differences between Israel’s proposal for three demilitarized zones and Syria’s counterproposal, which demands Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territory and the redeployment of a UN observer force, suggest that an agreement is not imminent.
Since Netanyahu’s February 2025 call for the complete demilitarization of southern Syria, the Israeli government has continued to push for this demilitarization by carring out airstrikes against Syrian government forces that have breached the desired zone.
Last week, the Syrian government forces withdrew all “heavy weapons” from southern Syria, relocating them in the north of Damascus.

US diplomats charged of affairs in Syria let go from their position
Recently, several top U.S. diplomats involved in Syrian affairs have been dismissed from their positions. While one U.S. diplomat claimed that these departures would not impact U.S. policy in Syria and were not due to disagreements with Barrack or the White House, another Western diplomat suggested that the ousting was partly driven by differing views between staffers and Barrack regarding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Al-Sharaa.
Barrack, who was appointed last May, has spearheaded a shift in U.S. policy towards supporting a unified Syrian state under Al-Sharaa, who took power after the ousting of Bashar al-Assad late last year. This dismissal coincides with a request from negotiators representing the Autonomous Administration, made two weeks prior, for “international guarantees” from Washington, Paris, and Riyadh to finalize any agreement with the Syrian government.

US, Jordan and STG created a roadmap for Suweida
The Suweida Autonomous Government has rejected a US-Syrian-Jordanian roadmap aimed at resolving intercommunal violence in Suweida Province. The roadmap was announced on September 16. Its stated goals are the guarantee of rights and promotion of societal reconciliation, but it did not include input from anti-government factions in Suweida.
The roadmap proposes security and administrative arrangements and commits the Syrian government to forming an independent commission to investigate crimes in Suweida.
The autonomous government’s judicial committee of Suweida criticized the plan for relying on a “corrupt” Syrian judicial system and viewing the Syrian government as a “neutral party.” The committee, along with its military wing comprising about 40 Druze militias, provides administrative services and security in central, southern, and eastern Suweida, while pro-government forces control the northern and western areas.
In their denunciation, the committee asserted that the violence in July 2025 justified the people of Suweida’s right to self-determination, which could include self-administration or secession from Syria.
The autonomous committee of Suweida’s statements is not the only element opposing the realization of the roadmap: The Druze leaders collaborating with the Syrian transitional government have lost local support since the July massacres, with many viewing them as a traitor.
Additionally, Israeli support for anti-government Druze factions impacts those reconciliation efforts: Israel, answering to calls from Druze leaders for international assistance, has provided arms and salaries to approximately 3,000 anti-government Druze militia members.

Negociations SDF-STG
On September 20, artillery shelling by the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces struck the village of Umm Tina located in the eastern countryside of Aleppo, resulting in the deaths of seven civilians and injuries to four others. In an official statement, the SDF described the incident as a “massacre” against civilians, noting that the attacks began with drones followed by heavy artillery shelling, which directly targeted residents’ homes.
On September 18, an exchange of small arms fire between the MoD forces and the SDF near Aleppo took place. No military casualties have been reported from this engagement. Prior to the exchange, a Turkish drone was observed flying over the area, likely conducting reconnaissance.
The recent involvment of a Turkish drone reconnaissance, is part of the broader increase in military cooperation between Syria and Turkey. On the same day, Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson stated that the Turkish military will remain in Syria to “fight terrorism,” likely refering to the SDF.
While Turkey supports military action against the SDF, Damascus has urged Turkey to delay such operations to provide additional time for negotiations. Al-Sharaa is unlikely to endorse any military action that would destabilize more Syria.

Eviction of 22000 Alawites from Damascus by GSS
Inhabitants of Damascus reported that between August 27 and 29, personnel from the General Security Services (GSS) forcibly evicted approximately 22,000 Alawite residents from the al Somaria neighborhood.
Residents of al Somaria said that GSS members demanded proof of home ownership and marked properties for eviction if such proof was not provided. The GSS justified these evictions by stating that the homes were built on land illegally seized by the Assad regime in the 1970s. This land was originally occupied after the regime forcibly displaced Sunni residents from the Muadamiyat al Sham neighborhood.
Over 200,000 former landowners from Muadamiyat al Sham and their heirs still claim the right to return to their land in al Somaria. Human rights experts stated that the GSS’s actions constitute selective forced evictions, lacking proper notice or alternative housing for those displaced. They argue that successful transitional justice for the evictions perpetuated by the Assad regime must respect the rights of original landowners and cannot be solely determined by the Syrian government.
The policies of the Syrian transitional government concerning Housing, Land, and Property violations in Damascus demonstrate its failure to engage with Syria’s necessary restorative process following Assad’s rule, the civil war, and the extensive displacement resulting from Turkish occupation.

08.09.25 – 14.09.25

Israeli airstrike on depot of Turkish weapons
On the 8th of September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck military facilities and weapons depots in Latakia and Homs provinces, some of which contained recently imported Turkish air defense systems. The IDF also targeted a Syrian Army barracks in Latakia Province, causing casualties.
An Israeli security official declared on the 9th of September that the IDF targeted Turkish missiles and air defense systems in Homs that Turkey had recently transferred to Syria. The following day, the Israeli Chief of Staff confirmed this information in a statement affirming that those weapons represented a threat to its freedom of action in Syria. The presence of these Turkish weapons on Syrian soil is the result of military agreements: the Syrian Transitional Government formally requested Turkish military assistance after Israeli strikes targeted Damascus and Suwayda Province during massacre targetting the Druze community in July.

Syrian soldiers and police officers in Turkey
Turkey has begun the training of aproximately 300 soldiers and police officers at two military bases located in central and eastern Turkey.
This training falls under the security agreements established on the 13th of August, which allow Syria to consult Turkey on military matters and includes provisions for Turkey to assist in procuring military equipment for Syria and training Syrian forces. Turkey plans to train 5,000 members of the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and police forces in the “short term,” with a goal of training “at least 20,000 in the medium to long term.”

Attempts from Turkey to acquire the houses of the displaced people from Serekaniye
Hundreds of displaced individuals from Serekaniye protested at the Waşokani Camp, condemning the display of Turkish and Pakistani flags in their hometown. The protest was sparked by reports of a Turkish-backed initiative to purchase the homes and lands of displaced people from Serekaniye, raising fears of ongoing demographic changes. The protesters rejected Turkey’s offers to buy their properties, describing it as a violation of their rights.
Additionally, a meeting in Serekaniye involved Turkish officials and local leaders discussing the acquisition of properties from displaced Kurds and Christians.
Turkey’s various efforts to acquire the properties of displaced individuals from Serekaniye is a way to undermine the implementation of the March 10 agreements, which stipulate that the return of displaced people from Afrin and Serêkaniyê to their homes must be facilitated.

SDF – MoD clashes
On the 10th of September, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the MoD engaged in artillery exchanges in Aleppo Province. The SDF launched multiple rocket artillery strikes that hit civilian residences in villages located in contested areas. This shelling resulted in the deaths of two civilians and injuries to seven others. In retaliation, MoD forces conducted counter-battery fire targeting SDF artillery positions. There have been no reported military casualties.
The SDF released a statement on the 11th of September, which claimed that the SDF “repelled” MoD forces who attempted to “infiltrate and launch artillery attacks in the Deir Hafer area,”.

SDF in Deir Ez Zor
On the 11th of September, the Arab al Shaytat clan mobilized against SDF following the killing of an unarmed civilian who did not stop at a checkpoint in Gharanij, Deir ez Zor Province. In response, the Gharanij mosque broadcast calls on social media for “jihad and general mobilization,”. The al Shaytat clan called on all clans in eastern Deir ez Zor Province to join their mobilization against the SDF. Residents of Gharanij attacked SDF checkpoints as a result of the killing and the mobilization order.
This mobilization follows heightened tensions between Arab tribes and the SDF, with seven Arab tribes announcing their own mobilization against the SDF on the 11th of August.
The mobilized tribes have indicated they are “waiting for the right moment to begin action,” which may refer to a potential breakdown in the ceasefire between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government.
A few days later on the 14th, during a raid campaign and siege of the Deir Ez Zor town of Darnaj, SDF faced a direct attack from armed groups affiliated with the Syrian Transitional Government.