20.10.25 – 26.10.25

PKK withdraws all fighters from Turkey
The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) announced on Sunday the complete withdrawal of its fighters from Turkish territory, describing this decision a pivotal step toward advancing the ongoing peace process with Ankara into a “second phase.”
During a press conference at Mount Qandil, attended by 25 PKK members and senior commanders, the revolutionary party declared, “These monumental steps taken by the Kurdish side, under the guidance of Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK, have significantly influenced Turkey’s political and social landscape, fostering a renewed commitment to peace and democratization,”.
The PKK framed the withdrawal as a means to “address serious threats faced by both Turkey and the Kurdish people, while laying the foundation for a free, democratic, and harmonious existence.” They reiterated their dedication to the peace process and called on Ankara to reciprocate with corresponding actions.
Observers suggest that the full withdrawal may open up new diplomatic avenues for both Ankara and the Kurdish movement, though skepticism persists, particularly in light of Turkey’s ongoing military operations in northern Iraq and Syria.

Renewed clashes between Syrian army and SDF
On Saturday, October 25, clashes broke out between the Syrian army and fighters from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) along the contact lines on both sides of the Euphrates River. The SDF, which attempted to infiltrate a Syrian army position, later claimed that their actions were a response to an attack by unidentified armed groups. Shortly after the fighting began, SDF forces withdrew to their original positions, with no casualties reported.
Minor clashes have continued to occur over the past week at various points along the contact lines between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces and the SDF: on Wednesday, armed groups linked to the interim government launched a suicide drone strike on the town of Deir Hafer.
These incidents arise amidst the ongoing integration of SDF into the New Syrian Army.

Syrian transitional government targeting non-integrated foreign fighters
On October 21, the General Security Service (GSS) attempted to raid a compound controlled by the French foreign fighter group “Fiqrat al Ghuraba” and Caucasian fighters near the Turkish border in Harem, Idlib Province. The day after the raids, a group of Uzbek foreign fighters was sent to Fiqrat al Ghuraba’s compound to provide reinforcements. On October 23, the GSS and the foreign fighter groups agreed to a ceasefire.
In the last months, the GSS has carried raids on foreign fighter groups that promote Salafi-jihadist ideologies and have not integrated into the MoD. For instance, in August 2025, the GSS arrested two Uzbek foreign fighters. These fighters had previously served as private military contractors training Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) special forces and participated in the offensive that ousted Assad in December 2024.
Fiqrat al Ghuraba has previously criticized the Syrian transitional government’s collaboration with U.S. forces in operations aimed at Salafi-jihadist groups.
Since June 2025, the Syrian government has integrated many loyal jihadist foreign fighters into the Syrian MoD. This integration aligns with a U.S. strategy that permitted the Syrian transitional government to incorporate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army, aiming to deter these fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups.

Rising ISIS threat amid US pullout
The Islamic State (ISIS) has been exploiting the diminished U.S. military presence and the political instability following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024. Data from the SDF shows a marked increase in ISIS attacks in 2025, as the group has acquired significant quantities of weapons from former Syrian army depots, thereby strengthening their combat capabilities.
SDF commander Goran Tal Tamr remarked that the U.S. withdrawal acts as “an inspiration for ISIS,” highlighting that the group’s activities have escalated amidst rising concerns among civilians about security.

Turkey’s support to the Syrian Ministry of Defense
On October 21, Turkish officials announced that they will supply the Syrian MoD with advanced military equipment in the coming weeks, including armored vehicles, drones, artillery, and air defense systems. The Syrian MoD plans to deploy this Turkish equipment in northern Syria allegedly to mitigate potential conflict with Israel.
Historically, Turkish and Turkish-backed forces have committed atrocities against the Kurdish minority in northern Syria, including acts of ethnic cleansing and other forms of violence. It is likely that Turkey’s increasing influence within the armed forces and other security services will impact negatively the integration of the SDF in the new syrian army.

Evaluation

The new phase of withdrawing PKK fighters from Turkey is the next step in the new strategy of the Apoist movement in the process of ‘Peace and Democratic Society.’ The direction taken at the beginning of this year is continuing. We cannot call this a surprise. According to the ‘Manifesto of Peace and Democratic Society,’ the Kurd’s struggle for recognition of their existence as a people has succeeded, and it is time to take the next step — the struggle for freedom. This refers not only to the freedom of the Kurdish people, but to universal freedom, because A. Öcalan and Apoist movement understand that the freedom of only one group of people in a limited territory is not a solution to the problem. The process of disarming the PKK and democratically integrating the regions of Kurdistan is, according to the manifesto, the path to this universal freedom, which, as Öcalan put it, cannot be achieved at gunpoint. The PKK has indeed achieved its stated goal, and the Marxist-Leninist party form no longer fits the new paradigm and is only a hindrance to bringing the structures into line with the ideology.

What does this mean for North-East Syria? Disarmament does not apply to the SDF, and armed defense continues. The region is still under threat from several sides, and autonomy must be defended. Despite hopes for further peace processes, the Apoist movement does not deny the need for armed self-defense, so the revolutionary project of Rojava will not be left defenseless. The SDF maintains its positions on the ground, and talk of disarming the forces has provoked a fairly unequivocal reaction in NE Syria, because Turkey has not yet taken any steps towards a peaceful resolution of this military conflict, and the situation in Syria remains unstable.

We are at a very important point: the fifty-year history of the PKK is coming to an end. This shows us that revolution and revolutionary movements are not something that can take only one form. But despite all these changes and flexibility in the choice of methods, the revolutionary movement here does not lose its direction and values. Freedom and equality are still the main guiding principles of the struggle.

Revolutionary greetings 🖤

13.10.25 – 19.10.25

SDF integration into the new Syrian army
On October 14 and 15, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) officials confirmed the integration of SDF into the new Syrian army, comprising three divisions and several independent brigades located in northeastern Syria (NES). SDF counterterrorism brigades will be deployed all over Syria. The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) will also form a brigade in the new army. Disagreements between Syrian government and SDF officials persist regarding the YPJ’s role in the new structure. On October 7, Mazloum Abdi and Al-Sharaa reached a “preliminary agreement” on military integration, though specifics remain unannounced. An “initial timeline” have been set for this integration by the end of 2025, but it was emphasized that it is not a definitive timeline.

SDF – Syrian government forces joint force to fight ISIS
Mazloum Abdi announced ongoing discussions with Damascus and Washington to establish a joint military force against ISIS. He described this initiative as part of a broader strategy to combat terrorism across Syria.
The commander of the SDF stated, “Washington proposed the creation of a joint force between us and Damascus to fight ISIS, and we have accepted.” He emphasized that the SDF aims to make the fight against ISIS “a comprehensive, nationwide effort.”
Abdi also mentioned that upcoming meetings between SDF and Syrian transitional government military committees will take place in Damascus to discuss coordination mechanisms.

Discussions Turkey – Syrian governement to expand Adana Agreement
On October 17, a Turkish officials stated that discussions are underway to expand the 1998 Adana Agreement, which currently permits Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to five kilometers into Syrian territory, raising the limit to 30 kilometers. Turkey is seeking an agreement with the Syrian government to allow its forces to target SDF fighters deep within Syria and potentially set the stage for future military operations against the SDF.
Expanding the agreement would facilitate Turkey’s operations within the 30-kilometer zone. While it has conducted strikes deeper than this limit in the past, a revised Adana Agreement would support ground pursuits and help mitigate friction with the new Syrian government.
It remains uncertain whether the Syrian government will agree to these terms, as it could jeopardize recent Kurdish cooperation.

Meeting Al Sharaa – Putin
Al-Sharaa met with Vladimir Putin on October 15. Sharaa expressed a desire to “redefine” the Syrian-Russian relationship, emphasizing Russia’s “significant role” in advancing Syria’s political goals. Putin indicated his support for new initiatives, particularly in Syria’s energy sector reconstruction.
The Russia-Syria relationship, evolving since the regime’s fall, now consists of mutually beneficial arrangements. Russia retains military presence at three bases in Syria, and has used economic support to secure its position under Sharaa’s government.
The Syrian government likely seeks military cooperation to gain insights for building a new army, although direct arms supplies from Russia are unlikely due to ongoing needs in Ukraine. Syria also needs economic support to address resource shortages, with Russia providing oil and wheat while discussing future involvement in infrastructure restoration. Furthermore, Syrian officials are likely working to secure Russia’s commitment to stop supporting members of the Assad regime to enhance their legitimacy and advocate for accountability. Engaging Russia may also serve to counterbalance Israel’s presence in southern Syria, with considerations for redeploying Russian military police in the area.

06.10.25 – 12.10.25

Clashes between Asayish and the Government Security Forces in Aleppo
The fighting erupted shortly after the Syrian Government Security Forces (GSS) discovered an alleged Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) tunnel extending from Kurdish areas into a nearby government-controlled neighborhood on October 6. The GSS reacted by sealing off all entrances and exits to Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud. In response to these closures, Kurdish residents staged protests. The GSS repressed them, killing four protesters and injuring many. The same night, clashes erupted between Syrian government forces and Asayish units, lasting for several hours.
On October 7, Mazloum Abdi and two other officials from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria traveled to Damascus for discussions with Al-Sharaa and the Syrian defense minister. Following their meeting, the minister announced an immediate “comprehensive ceasefire on all fronts” in northern and northeastern Syria. Thomas Barrack, who attended the meeting alongside the US Central Command Commander, stated that Al-Sharaa and Mazlum Abdi discussed both sides’ “recommitment” to the March 10 Agreement, indicating that they believe both parties are “heading in the right direction.”
The same day, the Syrian Transitional Government forces broke the ceasefire by bombing the SDF soldiers stationed on the west side of the Tishrin Dam.

SDF Makes New Steps to Join a New Syrian Army
In a ceremony celebrating the 10th anniversary of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi announced on Friday that the SDF will begin formal procedures to join a new Syrian army being established as part of the implementation of the March 10 agreements. He stated, “A military committee will soon travel to Damascus and discuss how the SDF will be integrated.”
Later on, the SDF commander expressed in an interview that the Syrian Transitional Government is showing a positive approach towards the issue of decentralization, noting that discussions are underway regarding amending the constitution and that the Syrian Democratic Forces and Asayish will join the Ministry of Defense. He also called on the people of Afrin to prepare for an organized return. While encouraging, those steps should be approached with caution, as there have been several unsuccessful attempts to achieve this goal in the past months.

Syrian Parliamentary Elections Took Place Without NES and Suweida
On October 5, parliamentary elections were held. They were a parody of democracy: Al-Sharaa has indirectly approved two-thirds of the elected candidates and will directly appoint the remaining members. Women’s representation in the newly elected assembly does not exceed three percent after the counting process. North-Eastern Syria and Suweida Governorate were arbitrarily excluded from the elections. The Syrian government justified this exclusion by citing that the security situation in those regions was too unstable for participation. Until further progress in the negotiations between them and Al-Sharaa’s government, the NES and Suweida seats will remain empty in the parliament. According to the plans set forth by Al-Sharaa’s administration, this assembly will maintain legislative authority until Syria adopts a permanent constitution with new legislative elections.

The National Guard Aims to Regain Control Over Suweida Government-Held Territories
On October 6, the National Guard, a coalition of anti-government Druze militias, stated that they seek to regain control over Suweidawi villages currently occupied by the Syrian Transitional Government. On October 9, the coalition stated that it will wait for a “political solution” from “guarantor states” to regain control of all of Suweida Province. The National Guard did not specify which “guarantor states” it seeks to collaborate with but thanked the United States and Israel for “standing” with Suweida and noted that the National Guard seeks further coordination with Israel. The same day, clashes erupted between Syrian government forces and a Druze armed group in the western part of Suweida Governorate. The National Guard denied any implication in the attack and called on its fighters to remain at their positions and to adhere to the ceasefire agreement.

29.09.25 – 05.10.25

Turkish military reinforcements
Turkish military deployed helicopters, air defenses and SYHK (armored vehicle-launched bridge systems, used to cross rivers) in the Kuweires Airbase, located about 10 kilometers west of the SDF-controlled town of Deir Hafer, which is the westernmost town that the SDF controls in the Aleppo province. The same source indicates that Turkish military also deployed reinforcements to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled towns of Gire Spi and Serekaniye. Such reinforcements can be seen as a way to pressure SDF to accept the integration conditions of the transitional goverment before the end of the year, the deadline agreed in the March 10th agreements.

Clashes in Tishrin and drone strike in tabqa
Armed groups affiliated with the Damascus government carried out heavy shelling on Tishrin Dam and its surroundings using tanks, other heavy weapons and drones. The shelling targeted heavy wepons positions of SDF, hitting some facilities of the Tishrin dam and damaging also civilian buildings of surrounding villages. SDF responded to the attacks with heavy weapons, no casualties reported. Days later, on Sunday, a drone striked SDF positions in the river crossing of Tabqa.

Partial parliamentary elections in Syria
Syria held its first parliamentary elections since the fall of al-Assad’s regime. The voting excluded the regions of Suwayda and the areas run by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and the 19 assigned seats to those regions are expected to remain vacant. Around 6,000 voters from regional electoral bodies were expected to participate, with 1,570 candidates running for office.

Syrian defense officials visit Moscow
An official delegation of defense official of Damascus government visited Moscow, amid an increased number of high-level meetings between Syrian and Russian defense officials in the past month. Such increase may suggest a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations.

Precision strikes of US in Idlib
The international coalition conducted at least two precision strikes on Idlib, targeting high rank salafist militant affiliated with al-Qaeda. In one of them they allegedly killed former Ansar al Islam leader Abu Darda Kurdi.

ISIS attacks on SDF
In its weekly publication al-Nabaa, an ISIS-affiliated outlet, the group announced responsibility for several attacks on SDF, claiming to have killed 11 SDF fighters, wounded 5 others, and destroyed 2 vehicles. They claim that most of their attacks targeted areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to “affirm the steadfastness” of those held in Hol Camp.

22.09.25 – 28.09.25

Al-Sharaa participated in the United Nations General Assembly
On September 24, Al-Sharaa addressed the UN General Assembly. In his speech, he asserted that Syria has shifted from being an “exporter of crises” to a potential source of peace and stability in the region. Al-Sharaa warned of external attempts to “incite sectarian conflict” aimed at destabilizing Syria and emphasized the government’s commitment to justice by establishing independent commissions to investigate past abuses.
Al-Sharaa also affirmed Syria’s dedication to dialogue and diplomacy with Israel, referencing the ongoing negotiations regarding security agreements. He condemned Israeli military operations against Syria, urging the international community to support Syria in addressing these threats. The UN General Assembly also provided the occasion for Al-Sharaa to meet with Trump, Erdogan, and Zelensky.

Meeting Al-Sharaa – Trump
Following the meeting between Trump and Al-Sharaa, various declarations and decisions were made by the Trump administration regarding Syria. The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the ending of the state of emergency associated with Bashar al-Assad’s rule and the lifting of broad-based sanctions. The sanctions framework was redefined as “Sanctions Regulations to Enhance Accountability for Assad and Regional Stability.” This change represents a shift from blanket sanctions to more targeted measures aimed at individuals and networks involved in war crimes, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking, particularly concerning the production and smuggling of captagon.
At the same time, Barrack announced that the formation of an “inclusive central government in Syria” is to be expected before the end of 2025, stressing that the U.S. does not consider federalism a suitable solution to the Syrian crisis. In his declaration, Barrack described the Suweida massacres as “regrettable.” Trump also revealed plans to issue an “important statement” regarding Syria and stated that lifting sanctions on Damascus was aimed at “giving Syrians breathing space” after previously “very strict” restrictions.

Meeting Al-Sharaa – Erdogan
The two presidents met on Wednesday during the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Erdogan restated the “necessity of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) adherence to the March 10 agreement with the Syrian government,” encouraging the Syrian government to increase military and political pressure on the SDF to integrate into Syria. Erdogan added that Turkish support for Syria would “continue to increase.”

Meeting Al-Sharaa – Zelensky
On Wednesday, following a meeting between Al-Sharaa and Zelensky, Ukraine and Syria officially restored diplomatic relations. The two leaders discussed common security threats and areas where Syria and Ukraine can enhance cooperation, which likely includes trade. Although this restoration marks a new phase in the rapprochement between the two countries, it is not the first initiative of its kind. On September 23, Syrian and Ukrainian port and trade officials convened in Damascus to explore ways to enhance their bilateral economic and trade relations. Additionally, during the decline of the Assad regime, the Ukrainian army sought to diminish Russia’s influence in Syria by providing training in drone tactics to the armed forces of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
The restoration of diplomatic relations between Syria and Ukraine also follows an increase in diplomatic contact between Russia and Syria in recent months.

SDF – MoD clashes
On September 23, the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) conducted several drone strikes to disable SDF artillery positions located south of Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province. The drone strike killed one SDF member and injured two others. The attack was followed by hours of MoD artillery shelling that hit civilian-populated areas, injuring four children. The SDF responded by targeting several MoD positions in the area with rocket artillery. In a statement, the SDF described the attacks of the Syrian MoD as “a military escalation aimed at destabilizing the region.”

Security talks between Syria and Israel break down
Negotiations between Syria and Israel regarding security have stalled due to Israel’s demand for a humanitarian corridor connecting Israel to Suweida. Since mid-August 2025, the two countries have been discussing the demilitarization of southwestern Syria, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories captured after the fall of the Assad regime, and the situation of the Druze community in Suweida. They were, according to U.S. representatives, close to finalizing a “de-escalation” agreement until Israel reintroduced its demand for the humanitarian corridor.

15.09.25 – 21.09.25

Israel proposal for security agreements with the Syrian Transitional Government
Israel has proposed a security agreement to Syria that would create three demilitarized zones in southern Syria, each with stricter regulations based on their proximity to the Syria-Israel border. This proposal, submitted to Syrian officials a few weeks ago, outlines the establishment of a no-fly zone for Syrian aircraft that extends into the territory south of Damascus. The primary objective is to secure an air corridor to Iran, facilitating potential future Israeli airstrikes.
Al-Sharaa stated on September 17 that a security agreement with Israel is essential, but it must respect Syria’s airspace and territorial integrity, and include UN supervision. The differences between Israel’s proposal for three demilitarized zones and Syria’s counterproposal, which demands Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territory and the redeployment of a UN observer force, suggest that an agreement is not imminent.
Since Netanyahu’s February 2025 call for the complete demilitarization of southern Syria, the Israeli government has continued to push for this demilitarization by carring out airstrikes against Syrian government forces that have breached the desired zone.
Last week, the Syrian government forces withdrew all “heavy weapons” from southern Syria, relocating them in the north of Damascus.

US diplomats charged of affairs in Syria let go from their position
Recently, several top U.S. diplomats involved in Syrian affairs have been dismissed from their positions. While one U.S. diplomat claimed that these departures would not impact U.S. policy in Syria and were not due to disagreements with Barrack or the White House, another Western diplomat suggested that the ousting was partly driven by differing views between staffers and Barrack regarding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Al-Sharaa.
Barrack, who was appointed last May, has spearheaded a shift in U.S. policy towards supporting a unified Syrian state under Al-Sharaa, who took power after the ousting of Bashar al-Assad late last year. This dismissal coincides with a request from negotiators representing the Autonomous Administration, made two weeks prior, for “international guarantees” from Washington, Paris, and Riyadh to finalize any agreement with the Syrian government.

US, Jordan and STG created a roadmap for Suweida
The Suweida Autonomous Government has rejected a US-Syrian-Jordanian roadmap aimed at resolving intercommunal violence in Suweida Province. The roadmap was announced on September 16. Its stated goals are the guarantee of rights and promotion of societal reconciliation, but it did not include input from anti-government factions in Suweida.
The roadmap proposes security and administrative arrangements and commits the Syrian government to forming an independent commission to investigate crimes in Suweida.
The autonomous government’s judicial committee of Suweida criticized the plan for relying on a “corrupt” Syrian judicial system and viewing the Syrian government as a “neutral party.” The committee, along with its military wing comprising about 40 Druze militias, provides administrative services and security in central, southern, and eastern Suweida, while pro-government forces control the northern and western areas.
In their denunciation, the committee asserted that the violence in July 2025 justified the people of Suweida’s right to self-determination, which could include self-administration or secession from Syria.
The autonomous committee of Suweida’s statements is not the only element opposing the realization of the roadmap: The Druze leaders collaborating with the Syrian transitional government have lost local support since the July massacres, with many viewing them as a traitor.
Additionally, Israeli support for anti-government Druze factions impacts those reconciliation efforts: Israel, answering to calls from Druze leaders for international assistance, has provided arms and salaries to approximately 3,000 anti-government Druze militia members.

Negociations SDF-STG
On September 20, artillery shelling by the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces struck the village of Umm Tina located in the eastern countryside of Aleppo, resulting in the deaths of seven civilians and injuries to four others. In an official statement, the SDF described the incident as a “massacre” against civilians, noting that the attacks began with drones followed by heavy artillery shelling, which directly targeted residents’ homes.
On September 18, an exchange of small arms fire between the MoD forces and the SDF near Aleppo took place. No military casualties have been reported from this engagement. Prior to the exchange, a Turkish drone was observed flying over the area, likely conducting reconnaissance.
The recent involvment of a Turkish drone reconnaissance, is part of the broader increase in military cooperation between Syria and Turkey. On the same day, Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson stated that the Turkish military will remain in Syria to “fight terrorism,” likely refering to the SDF.
While Turkey supports military action against the SDF, Damascus has urged Turkey to delay such operations to provide additional time for negotiations. Al-Sharaa is unlikely to endorse any military action that would destabilize more Syria.

Eviction of 22000 Alawites from Damascus by GSS
Inhabitants of Damascus reported that between August 27 and 29, personnel from the General Security Services (GSS) forcibly evicted approximately 22,000 Alawite residents from the al Somaria neighborhood.
Residents of al Somaria said that GSS members demanded proof of home ownership and marked properties for eviction if such proof was not provided. The GSS justified these evictions by stating that the homes were built on land illegally seized by the Assad regime in the 1970s. This land was originally occupied after the regime forcibly displaced Sunni residents from the Muadamiyat al Sham neighborhood.
Over 200,000 former landowners from Muadamiyat al Sham and their heirs still claim the right to return to their land in al Somaria. Human rights experts stated that the GSS’s actions constitute selective forced evictions, lacking proper notice or alternative housing for those displaced. They argue that successful transitional justice for the evictions perpetuated by the Assad regime must respect the rights of original landowners and cannot be solely determined by the Syrian government.
The policies of the Syrian transitional government concerning Housing, Land, and Property violations in Damascus demonstrate its failure to engage with Syria’s necessary restorative process following Assad’s rule, the civil war, and the extensive displacement resulting from Turkish occupation.