03.11.25 – 09.11.25

Syrian transitional government to join the anti-ISIS Coalition
The Syrian transitional government is poised to join the Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State (ISIS) during Al-Sharaa’s anticipated visit to Washington. This development would formalize 13 years of intelligence collaboration between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the US in combating ISIS and al-Qaeda networks in northern Syria.
Currently, the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the DAANES structures into the New Syrian Army and broader Syrian state framework is at a standstill. However, Syria’s potential entry into the coalition could bolster cooperation between the SDF and the New Syrian Army in the efforts against ISIS in the region.

US plan to deploy air force in Damascus
The United States is planning to establish a military presence at an undisclosed airbase in Damascus. On November 5 two Western officials and a Syrian defense official, affirmed that this military presence would allow the U.S. to monitor the potential agreement between Israel and Syria. This airbase is expected to be part of a demilitarized zone outlined in the agreement.
According to two Syrian military sources, US forces might utilize the base for logistical support, surveillance, refueling, and humanitarian missions, while Syria would maintain full sovereignty over the facility.
Until now, the Syrian Foreign Ministry denied these informations.

UN remove Al-Sharaa from terrorism lists
On November 6, the UN Security Council approved a US-backed resolution removing Al-Sharaa and Syria’s Interior Minister from the ISIS and al-Qaeda sanctions list. All members of the United Nations Security Council, with the exception of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), voted in favor of a motion. The PRC’s UN Ambassador urged the Syrian transitional government to take additional measures against “terrorism,” specifically mentioning the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). This reference likely refers to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).
PRC officials have consistently expressed concern regarding the Syrian transitional government’s decision to appoint Uyghurs associated with TIP to high-ranking positions in the Syrian army. The Syrian transitional government has rebranded TIP as the 84th Division within the new Syrian army.
Despite the PRC’s concerns regarding the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Chinese companies have continued to engage with the new Syrian government. On October 21, Syrian Economy Minister Mohammad announced that the transitional government is in the process of securing five to six investment projects with the PRC, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.

Continuous development:

• The Turkish state pursues its policies of demographic change and preventing the return of the local population by building colonial structures in the Afrin region. The construction of new residences called “Toros Housing Site” began on October 5 in the Afrin Canton.
• The Democratic Autonomous Administration of Cizire Canton in Northern and Eastern Syria organized the 1st Communes Conference of Jazira Canton. This conference takes place in the context of the DAANES efforts to revive the commune system in NES.

27.10.25 – 02.11.25

SDF – MoD clashes in Deir ez Zor
On October 25, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) engaged the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) forces with small arms and mortars across the Euphrates River. This engagement followed reports of an SDF attempt to infiltrate MoD positions. In response, the MoD reinforced its positions, while the SDF deployed a reconnaissance drone over the area.
Additionally, SDF forces in Abu Hamam engaged MoD positions across the Euphrates after receiving rocket-propelled grenade fire from MoD positions on the same day. The SDF officially acknowledged these clashes, stating that no casualties occurred.
These clashes come amid positive steps made in the negociations between the SDF and the Syrian Transitional Government: on October 20, a delegation from the transitional government’s Ministry of Interior visited Tabqa to discuss the security situation in Aleppo with SDF officials. During this visit, the SDF released several prisoners held by the transitional government as a gesture aimed at building trust between the two sides. Thomas Barrack also recently made positive evaluations regarding recent meetings he held with Mazlum Abdi.

Arab tribe mobilize against the SDF
On October 27, in Deir ez Zor Province, an SDF patrol shot and killed a member of the Bakara Tribe after the tribesman allegedly tried to overtake the patrol in his car. In retaliation, Bakara tribespeople attacked the SDF headquarters, injuring two SDF members and one civilian. The SDF issued an apology on October 28, describing the incident as an accident, and arrested the involved members.
Until December 2024, the Assad regime’s dominance in Syria deterred Arab tribes in Deir ez Zor Province from opposing the SDF, as aligning with the Assad regime was seen as a worse option than SDF politics. However, the ascent of Al-Sharaa to power have made tribal mobilization a more pressing issue, as tribes now view the politics of the Syrian transitional Government as viable alternatives to the SDF.

Israel and Syria made new steps toward reaching a security agreement
An Israeli official announced that negotiations with the Syrian transitional government are ongoing and near completion. The agreement will resemble the 1974 disengagement accord but will include minor adjustments, such as the establishment of joint US-Israeli-Syrian outposts along the border.
The official assured that Israel does not support separatist movements within Syria. In response to recent U.S. concerns about the situation in Suweida Governorate, the official clarified that Israel has no connections to Druze leader Hikmat al-Hajri or other local figures. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has supplied arms and paid salaries for Druze militias in Suweida Province since July in an effort to unite the militias against the Syrian transitional government. It is today unclear whether it continues to do so.
Furthermore, the Israeli official stated that the proposal for a humanitarian corridor to Suweida is not being considered anymore. Israel’s previous insistence on establishing a humanitarian corridor between Israel and Suweida contradicted various request from the Syrian government and led to the collapse of negotiations in September 2025.

Public trials for the perpetuators of the Alawite massacres
The Syrian Justice Minister announced on October 29 that the Justice Ministry will soon conduct public trials for individuals involved in the massacres committed on the Syrian coast in March 2025. The Syrian transitional government has arrested 298 individuals involved in the massacres. Some MoD fighters accused of atrocities have also been arrested, however these arrests have not been publicly disclosed.
These upcoming trials will permit to the Syrian Transitional Government to display a theatre of judicial independence and procedural transparency. Jolani has, on multiple occasions, strategically abandoned former HTS fighters to advance his political agenda. Undoubtedly, condemning 300 of his fighters will not pose a significant obstacle if it enhances the image of the “new Syrian leader” that Western media is eager to construct.

Continuous developments:

• IDF maintain their activities in Quneitra and Daraa, triggering protests in surrounding villages.
• SDF, backed by the coalition, captured five individuals belonging to ISIS cells during a joint security operation in Deir ez-Zor. Similar anti-ISIS operations are currently ongoing in Raqqa.
• Anti-government protest continue in Suweida governorate.

20.10.25 – 26.10.25

PKK withdraws all fighters from Turkey
The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) announced on Sunday the complete withdrawal of its fighters from Turkish territory, describing this decision a pivotal step toward advancing the ongoing peace process with Ankara into a “second phase.”
During a press conference at Mount Qandil, attended by 25 PKK members and senior commanders, the revolutionary party declared, “These monumental steps taken by the Kurdish side, under the guidance of Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK, have significantly influenced Turkey’s political and social landscape, fostering a renewed commitment to peace and democratization,”.
The PKK framed the withdrawal as a means to “address serious threats faced by both Turkey and the Kurdish people, while laying the foundation for a free, democratic, and harmonious existence.” They reiterated their dedication to the peace process and called on Ankara to reciprocate with corresponding actions.
Observers suggest that the full withdrawal may open up new diplomatic avenues for both Ankara and the Kurdish movement, though skepticism persists, particularly in light of Turkey’s ongoing military operations in northern Iraq and Syria.

Renewed clashes between Syrian army and SDF
On Saturday, October 25, clashes broke out between the Syrian army and fighters from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) along the contact lines on both sides of the Euphrates River. The SDF, which attempted to infiltrate a Syrian army position, later claimed that their actions were a response to an attack by unidentified armed groups. Shortly after the fighting began, SDF forces withdrew to their original positions, with no casualties reported.
Minor clashes have continued to occur over the past week at various points along the contact lines between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces and the SDF: on Wednesday, armed groups linked to the interim government launched a suicide drone strike on the town of Deir Hafer.
These incidents arise amidst the ongoing integration of SDF into the New Syrian Army.

Syrian transitional government targeting non-integrated foreign fighters
On October 21, the General Security Service (GSS) attempted to raid a compound controlled by the French foreign fighter group “Fiqrat al Ghuraba” and Caucasian fighters near the Turkish border in Harem, Idlib Province. The day after the raids, a group of Uzbek foreign fighters was sent to Fiqrat al Ghuraba’s compound to provide reinforcements. On October 23, the GSS and the foreign fighter groups agreed to a ceasefire.
In the last months, the GSS has carried raids on foreign fighter groups that promote Salafi-jihadist ideologies and have not integrated into the MoD. For instance, in August 2025, the GSS arrested two Uzbek foreign fighters. These fighters had previously served as private military contractors training Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) special forces and participated in the offensive that ousted Assad in December 2024.
Fiqrat al Ghuraba has previously criticized the Syrian transitional government’s collaboration with U.S. forces in operations aimed at Salafi-jihadist groups.
Since June 2025, the Syrian government has integrated many loyal jihadist foreign fighters into the Syrian MoD. This integration aligns with a U.S. strategy that permitted the Syrian transitional government to incorporate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army, aiming to deter these fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups.

Rising ISIS threat amid US pullout
The Islamic State (ISIS) has been exploiting the diminished U.S. military presence and the political instability following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024. Data from the SDF shows a marked increase in ISIS attacks in 2025, as the group has acquired significant quantities of weapons from former Syrian army depots, thereby strengthening their combat capabilities.
SDF commander Goran Tal Tamr remarked that the U.S. withdrawal acts as “an inspiration for ISIS,” highlighting that the group’s activities have escalated amidst rising concerns among civilians about security.

Turkey’s support to the Syrian Ministry of Defense
On October 21, Turkish officials announced that they will supply the Syrian MoD with advanced military equipment in the coming weeks, including armored vehicles, drones, artillery, and air defense systems. The Syrian MoD plans to deploy this Turkish equipment in northern Syria allegedly to mitigate potential conflict with Israel.
Historically, Turkish and Turkish-backed forces have committed atrocities against the Kurdish minority in northern Syria, including acts of ethnic cleansing and other forms of violence. It is likely that Turkey’s increasing influence within the armed forces and other security services will impact negatively the integration of the SDF in the new syrian army.

Evaluation

The new phase of withdrawing PKK fighters from Turkey is the next step in the new strategy of the Apoist movement in the process of ‘Peace and Democratic Society.’ The direction taken at the beginning of this year is continuing. We cannot call this a surprise. According to the ‘Manifesto of Peace and Democratic Society,’ the Kurd’s struggle for recognition of their existence as a people has succeeded, and it is time to take the next step — the struggle for freedom. This refers not only to the freedom of the Kurdish people, but to universal freedom, because A. Öcalan and Apoist movement understand that the freedom of only one group of people in a limited territory is not a solution to the problem. The process of disarming the PKK and democratically integrating the regions of Kurdistan is, according to the manifesto, the path to this universal freedom, which, as Öcalan put it, cannot be achieved at gunpoint. The PKK has indeed achieved its stated goal, and the Marxist-Leninist party form no longer fits the new paradigm and is only a hindrance to bringing the structures into line with the ideology.

What does this mean for North-East Syria? Disarmament does not apply to the SDF, and armed defense continues. The region is still under threat from several sides, and autonomy must be defended. Despite hopes for further peace processes, the Apoist movement does not deny the need for armed self-defense, so the revolutionary project of Rojava will not be left defenseless. The SDF maintains its positions on the ground, and talk of disarming the forces has provoked a fairly unequivocal reaction in NE Syria, because Turkey has not yet taken any steps towards a peaceful resolution of this military conflict, and the situation in Syria remains unstable.

We are at a very important point: the fifty-year history of the PKK is coming to an end. This shows us that revolution and revolutionary movements are not something that can take only one form. But despite all these changes and flexibility in the choice of methods, the revolutionary movement here does not lose its direction and values. Freedom and equality are still the main guiding principles of the struggle.

Revolutionary greetings 🖤

13.10.25 – 19.10.25

SDF integration into the new Syrian army
On October 14 and 15, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) officials confirmed the integration of SDF into the new Syrian army, comprising three divisions and several independent brigades located in northeastern Syria (NES). SDF counterterrorism brigades will be deployed all over Syria. The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) will also form a brigade in the new army. Disagreements between Syrian government and SDF officials persist regarding the YPJ’s role in the new structure. On October 7, Mazloum Abdi and Al-Sharaa reached a “preliminary agreement” on military integration, though specifics remain unannounced. An “initial timeline” have been set for this integration by the end of 2025, but it was emphasized that it is not a definitive timeline.

SDF – Syrian government forces joint force to fight ISIS
Mazloum Abdi announced ongoing discussions with Damascus and Washington to establish a joint military force against ISIS. He described this initiative as part of a broader strategy to combat terrorism across Syria.
The commander of the SDF stated, “Washington proposed the creation of a joint force between us and Damascus to fight ISIS, and we have accepted.” He emphasized that the SDF aims to make the fight against ISIS “a comprehensive, nationwide effort.”
Abdi also mentioned that upcoming meetings between SDF and Syrian transitional government military committees will take place in Damascus to discuss coordination mechanisms.

Discussions Turkey – Syrian governement to expand Adana Agreement
On October 17, a Turkish officials stated that discussions are underway to expand the 1998 Adana Agreement, which currently permits Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to five kilometers into Syrian territory, raising the limit to 30 kilometers. Turkey is seeking an agreement with the Syrian government to allow its forces to target SDF fighters deep within Syria and potentially set the stage for future military operations against the SDF.
Expanding the agreement would facilitate Turkey’s operations within the 30-kilometer zone. While it has conducted strikes deeper than this limit in the past, a revised Adana Agreement would support ground pursuits and help mitigate friction with the new Syrian government.
It remains uncertain whether the Syrian government will agree to these terms, as it could jeopardize recent Kurdish cooperation.

Meeting Al Sharaa – Putin
Al-Sharaa met with Vladimir Putin on October 15. Sharaa expressed a desire to “redefine” the Syrian-Russian relationship, emphasizing Russia’s “significant role” in advancing Syria’s political goals. Putin indicated his support for new initiatives, particularly in Syria’s energy sector reconstruction.
The Russia-Syria relationship, evolving since the regime’s fall, now consists of mutually beneficial arrangements. Russia retains military presence at three bases in Syria, and has used economic support to secure its position under Sharaa’s government.
The Syrian government likely seeks military cooperation to gain insights for building a new army, although direct arms supplies from Russia are unlikely due to ongoing needs in Ukraine. Syria also needs economic support to address resource shortages, with Russia providing oil and wheat while discussing future involvement in infrastructure restoration. Furthermore, Syrian officials are likely working to secure Russia’s commitment to stop supporting members of the Assad regime to enhance their legitimacy and advocate for accountability. Engaging Russia may also serve to counterbalance Israel’s presence in southern Syria, with considerations for redeploying Russian military police in the area.

06.10.25 – 12.10.25

Clashes between Asayish and the Government Security Forces in Aleppo
The fighting erupted shortly after the Syrian Government Security Forces (GSS) discovered an alleged Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) tunnel extending from Kurdish areas into a nearby government-controlled neighborhood on October 6. The GSS reacted by sealing off all entrances and exits to Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud. In response to these closures, Kurdish residents staged protests. The GSS repressed them, killing four protesters and injuring many. The same night, clashes erupted between Syrian government forces and Asayish units, lasting for several hours.
On October 7, Mazloum Abdi and two other officials from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria traveled to Damascus for discussions with Al-Sharaa and the Syrian defense minister. Following their meeting, the minister announced an immediate “comprehensive ceasefire on all fronts” in northern and northeastern Syria. Thomas Barrack, who attended the meeting alongside the US Central Command Commander, stated that Al-Sharaa and Mazlum Abdi discussed both sides’ “recommitment” to the March 10 Agreement, indicating that they believe both parties are “heading in the right direction.”
The same day, the Syrian Transitional Government forces broke the ceasefire by bombing the SDF soldiers stationed on the west side of the Tishrin Dam.

SDF Makes New Steps to Join a New Syrian Army
In a ceremony celebrating the 10th anniversary of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi announced on Friday that the SDF will begin formal procedures to join a new Syrian army being established as part of the implementation of the March 10 agreements. He stated, “A military committee will soon travel to Damascus and discuss how the SDF will be integrated.”
Later on, the SDF commander expressed in an interview that the Syrian Transitional Government is showing a positive approach towards the issue of decentralization, noting that discussions are underway regarding amending the constitution and that the Syrian Democratic Forces and Asayish will join the Ministry of Defense. He also called on the people of Afrin to prepare for an organized return. While encouraging, those steps should be approached with caution, as there have been several unsuccessful attempts to achieve this goal in the past months.

Syrian Parliamentary Elections Took Place Without NES and Suweida
On October 5, parliamentary elections were held. They were a parody of democracy: Al-Sharaa has indirectly approved two-thirds of the elected candidates and will directly appoint the remaining members. Women’s representation in the newly elected assembly does not exceed three percent after the counting process. North-Eastern Syria and Suweida Governorate were arbitrarily excluded from the elections. The Syrian government justified this exclusion by citing that the security situation in those regions was too unstable for participation. Until further progress in the negotiations between them and Al-Sharaa’s government, the NES and Suweida seats will remain empty in the parliament. According to the plans set forth by Al-Sharaa’s administration, this assembly will maintain legislative authority until Syria adopts a permanent constitution with new legislative elections.

The National Guard Aims to Regain Control Over Suweida Government-Held Territories
On October 6, the National Guard, a coalition of anti-government Druze militias, stated that they seek to regain control over Suweidawi villages currently occupied by the Syrian Transitional Government. On October 9, the coalition stated that it will wait for a “political solution” from “guarantor states” to regain control of all of Suweida Province. The National Guard did not specify which “guarantor states” it seeks to collaborate with but thanked the United States and Israel for “standing” with Suweida and noted that the National Guard seeks further coordination with Israel. The same day, clashes erupted between Syrian government forces and a Druze armed group in the western part of Suweida Governorate. The National Guard denied any implication in the attack and called on its fighters to remain at their positions and to adhere to the ceasefire agreement.

29.09.25 – 05.10.25

Turkish military reinforcements
Turkish military deployed helicopters, air defenses and SYHK (armored vehicle-launched bridge systems, used to cross rivers) in the Kuweires Airbase, located about 10 kilometers west of the SDF-controlled town of Deir Hafer, which is the westernmost town that the SDF controls in the Aleppo province. The same source indicates that Turkish military also deployed reinforcements to the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)-controlled towns of Gire Spi and Serekaniye. Such reinforcements can be seen as a way to pressure SDF to accept the integration conditions of the transitional goverment before the end of the year, the deadline agreed in the March 10th agreements.

Clashes in Tishrin and drone strike in tabqa
Armed groups affiliated with the Damascus government carried out heavy shelling on Tishrin Dam and its surroundings using tanks, other heavy weapons and drones. The shelling targeted heavy wepons positions of SDF, hitting some facilities of the Tishrin dam and damaging also civilian buildings of surrounding villages. SDF responded to the attacks with heavy weapons, no casualties reported. Days later, on Sunday, a drone striked SDF positions in the river crossing of Tabqa.

Partial parliamentary elections in Syria
Syria held its first parliamentary elections since the fall of al-Assad’s regime. The voting excluded the regions of Suwayda and the areas run by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, and the 19 assigned seats to those regions are expected to remain vacant. Around 6,000 voters from regional electoral bodies were expected to participate, with 1,570 candidates running for office.

Syrian defense officials visit Moscow
An official delegation of defense official of Damascus government visited Moscow, amid an increased number of high-level meetings between Syrian and Russian defense officials in the past month. Such increase may suggest a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations.

Precision strikes of US in Idlib
The international coalition conducted at least two precision strikes on Idlib, targeting high rank salafist militant affiliated with al-Qaeda. In one of them they allegedly killed former Ansar al Islam leader Abu Darda Kurdi.

ISIS attacks on SDF
In its weekly publication al-Nabaa, an ISIS-affiliated outlet, the group announced responsibility for several attacks on SDF, claiming to have killed 11 SDF fighters, wounded 5 others, and destroyed 2 vehicles. They claim that most of their attacks targeted areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to “affirm the steadfastness” of those held in Hol Camp.