All posts by tekosinaanarsist

Weekly Highlights 12.05.25 – 19.05.25

12.05.25 – 19.05.25

Deir Ezzor security operations and ISIS activities.

After continued attacks on SDF checkpoints in eastern Deir Ezzor, SDF deployed additional forces to carry out a wider security operation. More than 10 ISIS linked individuals have been arrested after an extensive intelligence research, focused not just on sleeping cells, but targeting also networks of weapons and oil smuggling often connected with ISIS activities. Despite the defeat of the caliphate, insurgent activity of ISIS in the desert areas of central Syria continued. Since the collapse of the al-Assad regime, sunni fundamentalist groups are disappointed with the moderate politics of the transitional government of al-Sharaa. ISIS is exploiting those frustrations to recruit insurgents into their ranks, increasing their activities and expanding their networks. Syrian authorities also claim the arrest of an ISIS cell in Aleppo, as a reaction to a deadly attack of the fundamentalist group on a public security facility that resulted in the death of a security officer.

Trump – Al-Sharaa meeting in Saudi Arabia:

Trump announced in Riyadh that he will lift the sanctions on Syria, presenting it as “a new opportunity” for the Syrian government to restore stability. The declaration came during his speech at the Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum in Riyadh, where Trump is on a high-profile tour on middle east. After that announcement, a face to face meeting between Trump and al-Sharaa took place, together with Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Erdoğan, who joined online. The White House announced their request for Syria to expel Palestinian terrorists groups and to join the Abraham agreements (agreements of normalization of relations between Israel and Arab nations). Another major request was for the Syrian government to assume full responsibility for ISIS detention centers of northeast Syria, currently under control of SDF. The previous request of US for lifting sanctions of removing foreign islamists from government positions was not mentioned. Al-Sharaa invited U.S. companies to invest in Syria’s oil and gas sectors.

More HTS and SNA appointments in government positions

The government of al-Sharaa continues to appoint important figures of HTS in key positions of the transitional government. This include Abdul Qader al Tahhan (Abu Bilal Quds) as Deputy Interior Minister for National Security Affairs, Hakim al Deiri (Dia al Din al Omar) as General Security Services (GSS) Director of Latakia Province and Muhammad Taha al Ahmad as Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs. Also this week a meeting with leading commanders of SNA was held nearby Serekaniye. They discussed about integration of different SNA groups in the new Syrian army, without requiring them to reform or restructure their forces. This brings important questions for the future of the M4 strip area between Serekaniye and Gire Spi, occupied by Turkish proxies since 2019. Thousands of families are waiting to return to their homes after they were expelled by the Turkish military operations more than 5 years ago.

PKK ceasing activities

After a two day congress held in Irak, PKK announced that it will cease activities under such name and that the organization will disband. This statement follows the call of their imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, calling for a peace process and the resolution of the Kurdish question over political means. Turkish state welcomed the statement, but announced that it will continue its ground military operations on areas under control of PKK. Turkish President Erdoğan made declarations calling for the process of dissolution and disarmament to also involve the Syrian and European branches of the organization.

Mazloum Abdi, head of SDF, welcomed the announcement of PKK describing it as a “historic and courageous” decision, marking what he called a pivotal moment for politics and peace in the Middle East. “The PKK’s decision to dismantle its organizational structure, end the armed struggle, and adopt democratic politics based on the call of leader Abdullah Öcalan is commendable. We are confident this step will pave the way for a new phase of politics and peace in the region.”

Evaluation

For more than six and a half months we have been reporting about the ongoing situation on Syria, with special focus on the development of the revolutionary process of north-East Syria. The region has been experiencing deep political changes and transformations, that we try to analyze combining the information that gets published with our experiences and sources on the ground.

We reached a point were this task is getting heavier for us, not being able to fully grasp the meaning of the unfolding events. In these circumstances, we consider it appropriate to re-evaluate our tasks and our role as anarchists in north-east Syria. We want to provide accurate evaluations, in line with our political perspectives and coherent with the principles of critical solidarity that characterize our vision of internationalism.

The implications of what we are witnessing stretches beyond what we expected. We need to be careful about what we share with you all, and we will need some time to reflect what is happening in the new Syria that is being made, what implications does it have for Kurdistan and for Middle east and how this will affect the rest of the world. Overall, we need to reflect what lessons we, as well as other revolutionary movements, can learn from this situation.

Revolutionary greetings

Situation Rojava: Theory and Analysis

This article was originally published in Organise magazine on 14/04/25

Introduction: Short summary of the geopolitical context of Rojava

The context of Rojava, western Kurdistan, can’t be understood without talking about Syria but also about the other parts of Kurdistan. We won’t extend too much on the past, but we need to start with European powers reorganizing what became known as middle east after first world war. Kurdish people, divided in 4 newly created nation states, became the largest people without state. The French protectorate of Syria lasted until the end of second world war, followed by short lived governments and military coups on 1949, 1954, and 1961. On 1963 the military committee of the Ba’ath Party that led the coup of 1961 overtook the government, and on 1970 Hafez al-Assad took the presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic. After his dead in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad was brought from UK, where he studied medicine, to take over the presidency of the country. After some hope of democratic reforms, soon he continued the despotic and authoritarian practices of his father. Continue reading Situation Rojava: Theory and Analysis

Weekly Highlights 05.05.25 – 11.05.25

05.05.25 – 11.05.25

Visit al-Sharaa in France:
Al-Sharaa visited France to have a meeting with Emmanuel Macron. News reported Macron’s proposal to strengthen the cooperation of the new government with SDF in the fight against ISIS. In the press conference after the meeting, The French president congratulated the common efforts of Syria’s transitional government and the Syrian Democratic Forces that resulted in the agreements of the 10th of March, calling it “an important stage in Syria’s history”. Macron called for a continuation of “the gradual lifting of European economic sanctions” if the new Islamist authorities stabilize the country. He added that USA should follow the same path and also should, “as long as possible”, not withdraw American troops from Syria.
Demonstrations organized by Syrian migrants took place in France to denounce the meeting with the former leader of HTS. This meeting happened a week after a declaration from the foreign affairs ministry condemning the massacres perpetuated on the Druze population of Suweida. The declaration urged the Damascus transitional government to take back the control of a situation caused by “outlawed groups”.

New appointment in Damascus forces:
On May 5th (Monday), Damascus transitional government appointed Ahmad al-Hays (Abu Hatem Shaqra) as new leader of the 86th division, responsible of security of the areas of Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and Hasaka. In 2018, he was implicated in the trafficking of Yazidi women and children and in recruiting former ISIS members. He is also responsible of the brutal murder of Hevrin Khalaf in 2019, who was the general secretary of the Future Syrian Party. Ahmad Al-Hayes is on the U.S. sanctions list accused of grave human rights abuses and links to the Islamic State (ISIS). A statement from the DAANES condemned the appointment. Kongra Star, the main structure of the women’s movement in Syria called for accountability, requiring the revocation of Al-Hays appointment and an apology to the family of Hevrin Khalef. On Thursday, the U.S. State Department strongly criticized the transitional Syrian government for this appointment in a press conference.

Continuation of the tensions in Suweida:
The tensions that started last week in the region of Suweida escalated. On thursday, forces connected to the military council of Suweida carried out an ambush on a car of the security forces of Damascus. The escalating violence pushed 300 students to be evacuated out from their university in emergency. Agreements are being made for Security forces of Damascus recently deployed in the area to withdraw, letting local police security forces from Suweida to take care of security. Different groups from the Druze community are calling for restraint and cooperation with Damascus government, while the military council of Suweida seems determined to fight for the defense of the Druze autonomy.

Victory on Tishreen:
The DAANES put an end to the rotations of civilians convoys going to Tirshin to support the SDF forces fighting. In the final statement of the last civilian convoy, victory was declared. The resistance of the dam stopped the attacks of turkish proxy forces, preventing the invasion of Kobane and further war against the DAANES territories. They remembered and thanked all those who gave their life in the defense of the dam, both civilians and military, as well as all those injured in the resistance.
Forces connected to the transitional government continue to be deployed in the surrounding villages, as SDF also continues reinforcing the region. For now, the military conflict is over, but clashes can restart in a near future if the negotiations don’t reach satisfactory agreements for both sides.

PKK 12th congress:
Between the 5th and the 7th of may, PKK held its 12th congress. Proposals and perspectives from Abdullah Ocalan were read and discussed, together with a report of the PKK Central Committee. PKK commemorated the martyrs of the revolution and called on “patriotic people and all democratic socialist forces to properly embrace and live in accordance with all the national and democratic values”. They announced that more details about the the congress will be published in the coming days.

Evaluation:

The resistance in Tishreen declared victory over the attacks of Turkish proxies, concluding almost 4 months of civilian vigil. People from all territories of the DAANES, from Kobane to Deir Ezzor, joined this popular initiative to defend the dam and stop the enemy advance. The combination of military defense and civilian resistance is a clear example of how the revolutionary principles of this revolution are put in practice. It shows the will and determination of the people of North-East Syria, ready to fight to protect their land and defend the achievements of the revolution. It also shows the value of diversity of tactics, how different elements can combine and support each other if they share common revolutionary aims.

The appointment of Abu Hatem Shaqra as leader of the 86th division is bold decision that will have serious implications. The Damascus government making such appointment is an attempt to exercise power and demonstrate authority over North-East Syria, questioning SDF and the inhabitants of North eastern Syria. It is a direct and conscious provocation from a newly born authoritarian regime, that will for sure undermine the already challenging negotiation for integration of SDF in the new Syrian army. Abu Hatem Shaqra’s connection to the turkish secret services is beyond question: he was the commander of a turkish backed group (Ahrar al-Sharqiya) and joined several meetings organized by the MIT during the Afrin war. For turkey, positioning SNA commanders like Abu Hatem Shaqra or Fahim Issa (nominated at the head of the ministry of defense of Syria a month ago) in the higher ranks of the new Syrian Army is a way to ensure influence and to guarantee the alignment of the new Syrian army with Turkish interests. His appointment also questions the US, which has his name on a terrorist list and already made statements condemning such decision.

The visit of al-Sharaa in France may seem a contradictory event, specially when UN and many French politicians opposed such a visit. The French president made special permission for him, allowing the head of the transitional government to visit Europe for the first time. For al-Sharaa, this trip is another step towards legitimacy, probably hoping that other European states will follow the French example, also gathering support for the EU to lift economic sanctions on Syria. The French president emphasized their wish for the Syrian transitional government to strengthen collaboration with SDF, knowing that many international ISIS fighters in NES prisons have French nationality. Discussions about the new Syrian government taking control of ISIS prisons, as Turkey already proposed, necessarily rings the alarms for many countries. Intelligence services all over the world are worried about the future of those experienced salafist militants, especially if the current islamist government takes control of those prisons. Even if we can’t be sure about it, this was probably one of the main reasons that motivated French state to invite al-Shara.

News about the recent congress of PKK are also raising questions about what implications will it have not only for Syria, but for all parts of Kurdistan. As for now not much information is available on what agreements were reached in the congress, but it is expected that official statements will soon be published.

Revolutionary greetings!

Weekly Highlights 28.04.25 – 04.05.25

28.04.25 – 04.05.25

Clashes in Druze regions
After an audio of a druze sheik insulting prophet Mohamed spread in social networks, extremist sunni groups attacked checkpoints on druze areas, targetings druze self-defense forces as well as checkpoint of the General Security Services (GSS) of the Ministry of Defense. The audio was confirmed fake, but clashes escalated with dozens of deads and many injured. Druze leaders condemned the attacks, some blaming the transitional government and comparing it with the massacres in coastal areas.
Among those killed in clashes there is a leading figure of “men of dignity”, the biggest local druze force, currently in negotiations with the provisional government to integrate forces in the new Syrian army. Several fighters of the GSS were also killed, as more forces were deployed in the region to deter further attacks against druze population. Delegetes of the provisional government held meetings with druze leaders to de-escalate the situation.

Israeli bombing campaign
With the tensions surrounding the clashes on Druze regions, Israel bombed some positions where clashes were taking place. They also launched a wider bombing campaign targeting military positions of the GSS. One of the bombs was dropped a few meters away of the presidential Palace in Damascus. Israel ministery of Defense declared that the bombing was a warning to stop the attacks against Druze population, announcing plans for further attacks and expansion of their military campaign if the provisional government doesn’t protect minorities. Many military positions around Syria were targeted, destroying military infrastructure and injuring military personnel. Some Druze civilians were also killed in one of the bombings of Israel. Many governments strongly condemned the attacks of Israel, including UN delegates, denouncing how Israel interference is threatening the stability of Syria.

Stalling of the negotiations with NES
No new steps were taken in the negotiations after the agreements of March 10 were signed by Mazlum Abdi and Ahmed al-Shara. The damascus government criticized the conference of Kurdish national unity, accusing it of an effort to create division and separatism. Calls of the DAANES for a federal Syria are not being listen to by the central government, that sees the efforts to sustain the self-government structures as a threat to their model of centralized government. GSS forces have been deploying in the suroundings of Tishreen dam, even if no clashes are taking place there since mid April. SDF is also increasing security in the region, building up tensions that can spark future conflicts.

ISIS leader captured in Deir Ezzor
SDF captured a senior leader in the Islamic State (ISIS) in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, eastern Syria. The continued work to monitor and target high rank ISIS insurgents, with support of the international coalition. The arrested leader served as the head of an ISIS cell focused on extorting money from civilians. A large cache of weapons and ammunition was also captured during the operation.

Turkey building gas pipe in Idlib
The ministeries of energy of Syria and Turkey  announced new agreements to provide energy to Syria. A new gas pipe is being build in Idlib, with promises to supply up to 6 million cubic liters of gas to power plans in Syria, with promises of a second pipe line also being build. A general framework agreement on energy cooperation between Syria and Turkey is expected to be signed soon.

Evaluation:

The clashes in Sweyida and the attacks on druze regions, south of Damascus, are a trigger warning for all minorities in Syria. The recent massacres against Alawites are still very present for many, especially for those who oppose the power grab of al-Shara. Maybe because of that, the central goverment seems to be reacting much faster that they did in the coastal regions, with rapid deployment of security forces to prevent a spiral of violence going out of control.

Kurdish areas are closely following the events, knowing that if this can happen to the Alawites and the Druze, the Kurds may be next. These incidents may affect the negotiations about integration of SDF in the new Syrian army, because if the transitional government can’t prevent attacks on minorities, autonomous means of self-defense are the only way to ensure security. The tensions are also to be noticed in Tishreen dam, where military presence is building up in both sides of the river.

The Israeli attacks are using the incidents in Druze regions as an excuse to promote their agenda, destroying military infrastructure and justifying their armed operations in Syria. Turkey is among the strongest voices against the Israeli attacks, fueling tensions between the two major competing powers for influence in the region.

For someone with a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Syria has been drowning in war for over a decade, with military force being the dominant force that shaped the present. It is not easy to escape that spiral of violence, and even after the regime has fallen, demilitarization of a conflict is a very complicated process.

Looking at the rest of the world, at how many states are racing to increase their military budgets to unseen levels, it is more clear every day that we are moving globally towards war. This is not something we wanted to see, but we also have a responsibility to understand what is happening around us and react to it. We need to be ready for what is comming, and start working today to build the means of resistance that we will need tomorrow. When the war starts, it is often to late, and only those who are ready to face the challenges that arise can bring their proposals on the table.

Revolutionary greetings!

 

Between autonomy and integration: Rojava navigating the new Syria

This article was written for the magazine of UCL on April 2025

Introduction

Rojava is a place of attention for many libertarian socialists, with anarchist organizations from all over the world supporting and discussing the developments of north-east Syria for over a decade. The developments of the last months are opening a new chapter for Syria. This also has very serious implications for the revolutionary process in the north. In this article we will share facts and also our opinions on the recent agreements between Mazlum Abdi, commander in chief of SDF, and Ahmed al-Shara, Chief of HTS and interim president of Syria. We will briefly contextualize recent developments of the last months, but won’t extend on that since many other articles have already been written.

The offensive that changed Syria

The military offensive that started at the end of November 2024 surprised many. The ranks of the Syrian Arab Army, encircling Idlib to contain the armed forces that fought the Assad regime for more than a decade, collapsed in matter of days under the advance of the Islamist forces of HTS. We won’t dive much on military or geopolitical aspects, but the local production of Shaheen kamikaze drones that supported HTS offensive is one of the key elements of their victory. The full support of Turkey, as well as the tacit agreement of western powers for their offensive, is without any doubt another key element to understand the success of their offensive.

In less than a week they took control of Aleppo, the second biggest city of Syria. Most of the regime soldiers did not fight back, running away as soon as the enemy got close to their positions. After Aleppo, the offensive continued towards the next important cities, Hama and Homs, which easily fell under control of the insurgent advance. Another front opened in the south, that started to advance towards Damascus. With the southern front entering the capital, and the northern one getting close, Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow marking the end of more than 60 years of al-Assad dynasty.

The collapse of the Assad regime was celebrated all around Syria, including the territories of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North-East Syria (DAANES), where statues of Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez al Assad were toppled down as the regime soldiers abandoned their positions. SDF negotiated with the remaining regime soldiers to take control of several military positions before they abandoned them, making sure that ISIS, still active in the desert areas of central Syria, didn’t get hold of a big stockpile of weapons and advanced military equipment. SDF took control of the city of Deir Ezzor, as well as the gas and oil fields of southern Raqqa, to negotiate later a transfer of the military presents to the provisional government that took control of the capital.

After entering Damascus, HTS imported the “Syrian Salvation Government”, a local government that was ruling Idlib, and supplanted with it the central government, becoming the de facto the new central administration of Syria. This didn’t effect the administration of DAANES in the north and east Syria, and it also had little to no effect to other areas with strong local administrations like the Durze community in Suweyda, in southern Syria. The regions of Tartus and Latakia, with an Alawite population majority that have been the strongholds of the Assad regime, also did not easily accept the new central administration. A wave of insurgency against HTS fighters erupted in the following months in those areas, following massacres and desecration of sacred Alawite places from the Sunni Islamist groups.

The offensive that topple down the regime got a lot of international attention, but not so much was said about the other war that was fought in parallel to that. The Syrian National Army (SNA), a Turkish armed, trained and paid proxy force in Syria, has been waging a war against SDF. They managed to capture the city of Manbij, planning to take also Kobane and the rest of kurdish regions, hoping for the collapse of the DAANES. But SDF did not collapse as the Syrian Arab Army, it stopped the Islamist Turkish proxies on the shores of the Eufrates River. The bridge of Qereqozah, connecting Manbij and Kobane regions, and the Tishrin dam over the same river, became the choke points were SDF broke the advance of SNA. Dozens of attacks from the different Islamist groups aligned with Turkey were sent to cross those strategic bridges, but they couldn’t advance in the face of the fierce resistance of SDF. The banner with the slogan “No passaran” that hung in Madrid on the Spanish revolution would fit much better to what happened on the Tishrin resistance, were wave after wave of enemy forces were crashed by the anti-fascist resistance that has managed to keep control of the Dam.

The resistance of Tishrin would not have been possible if it was not for thousands of civilians that traveled there, defending the dam and denouncing the brutal aggression of Turkish attacks. More than 20 civilians were killed in the constant drone strikes and shelling, but this did not deter the people of North-East Syria to keep going to defend the dam. This combination of civilian resistance in the dam, together with the military defense in the surrounding areas, made possible to break the offensive of the Turkish proxies. The Neo-ottoman aspirations of the Turkish government, that hoped to take control of northern Syria at the same time as HTS took hold of Damascus, have been foiled by the resistance and determination of the people of north and East Syria.

Negotiations between SDF and HTS

The negotiations between SDF and HTS have been an important element to understand how the situation unraveled. Before the offensive, some commercial agreements existed to coordinate exchange of oil, gas and other supplies between HTS controlled territories and areas of the DAANES. When the offensive started, the forces defending the historic Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo (Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiya) became a critical topic. When the Assad regime asserted control of the city in 2016, Kurdish forces defended those neighborhoods, affirming their autonomy and connection with the rest of territories of the DAANES. Since then, the neighborhoods co-existed with the regime control of the city, not fighting them but not letting them access inside the Kurdish areas. When HTS fighter started to enter Aleppo, Russian envoys tried to convince the SDF to fight alongside the regime, but SDF refused. Allegedly, some agreements of non-aggression were made between HTS command and SDF command, and after HTS fighter took control of the Aleppo and started moving to Hama without clashing with kurdish forces, it seem clear that neither HTS or SDF had intentions to fight each other, hoping for the collapse of the regime and the possibility of understanding in a post-Assad Syria.

After Assad left, al-Jolani, leader of HTS, dropped his jihadist nome de guerre and used again his legal name, al-Sharaa, in the interviews he avidly gave to western journalists. He had a very controlled media strategy, portraying himself as a moderate and rational Syrian rebel, downplaying his role in the ranks of Jabat al-Nusra as Syrian branch of al-Qaeda calling now for an inclusive and democratic Syria. Western propaganda helped him to spread this image of strong man, and he rapidly changed his green military shirt for a suit and tie, promising to respect the diversity of Syria and to not wage war against christians or kurds. On their side, the official building of the DAANES also raised the independence flag, signifying the will to be part of the transitional process of the new Syria. The SDF also made important concessions, withdrawing from the city of Deir Ezzor and from the gas and oil fields of southern Raqqa allowing the forces of the new provisional government to take control of those areas. Those movements paved the road to the agreements that were signed on March 10 between Mazlum Abdi and Ahmed al-Shara in the presidential palace of Damascus. The documents signed included a list of 8 points, establishing the foundations for future negotiations and agreements:

1 – Political Participation – Full representation and rights for all Syrian communities, including Kurds, in state institutions based on merit rather than sectarian or ethnic background.
2 – Kurdish Rights – Recognition of the Kurdish community as an integral part of Syria, ensuring constitutional rights and citizenship protections.
3 – Security and Stability – A ceasefire across Syrian territories, aiming to reduce hostilities and facilitate political dialogue.
4 – Institutional Integration – The merging of all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria into the national framework, including border crossings, airports, and energy resources.
5 – Refugee Return – Guarantees for the safe return of displaced Syrians to their homes under government protection.
6 – Sovereignty Protection – Joint efforts to counter external threats, including armed groups and foreign interventions that destabilize Syria.
7 – Combating Extremism – Enhanced cooperation in counterterrorism efforts against ISIS and other extremist factions.
8 – Ending Division and Sectarian Rhetoric – Rejecting hate speech and ensuring national reconciliation.

These points are quite open, expressing a common understanding to continue negotiations more than concrete steps on how to do it. Committees have been created to asses further steps on how to put in practice those agreements, expecting to reach concrete proposals for the end of 2025.

The first significant step to implement those agreements has been the withdrawal of YPG and YPJ from the Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo, that started on April and is planned to take place in three phases. The Assayish (local security forces) will remain in the neighborhoods, with promises of being integrated in the internal security structures of the Aleppo. A reduced number of military checkpoints of the provisional government are allowed in the neighborhood as the YPG and YPJ checkpoints are dismantled, removing also the rest of physical barriers and barricades that were raised by the Kurdish people to defend their homes. All citizens of Aleppo will have freedom of movement and no extra road blocks will be raised, the blockade that was imposed also during the last years of the Assad regime is over and trade is normalizing. The negotiations also included and agreement for exchange of prisoners between both sides, the first two exchanges already took place without incidents at the time of writing this article. This makes the Aleppo process a potential blueprint for normalization of other contested areas.

How does agreements affect the revolution?

The first thing that may need clarification is why the commander of SDF, a force with more than a 100.000 fighters, traveled to Damascus to sign an agreement with the leader of HTS, with a force estimated of 30.000 fighters. To understand this we also need to count the influence of Turkey, who not only controls the SNA (with an estimated force of around 60.000 fighters) but that also holds the key for western governments to negotiate with Damascus. The government of Erdogan has been working as the liaison between the head of HTS and representatives of western governments as well as other Arabic countries. Turkey has been a key ally of HTS for several years, and Turkish military points around Idlib functioned as a deterrence for the Syrian Arab Army to enter Idlib with full force. This allowed HTS to consolidate their forces and prepare the offensive that provided the final blow to the decrepit regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Turkish support for HTS is not exempt of contradictions, and over the last months there have been some tensions and disputes over different topics. Nevertheless, their alliance is deep, and several representatives of the provisional government have strong ties with Turkish State. One of the most prominent examples is the new Syrian minister of foreign relations, Assad Hassan al-Shaibni, who just finished his PhD on political science and international relations in the Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University on 2024. The Grand Mufti of Syria and newly appointed leader of the Supreme fatwa council, Osama al-Rifai, also has close ties with Erdogan and his circles, being also aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. Many commanders of the SNA divisions are being appointed for important positions in the new Syrian army, like Abu Amsha, leader of the Hamza division, group responsible for the assassination of the Kurdish politician Hevrin Xalef in 2019. All these names are just some examples of how far the influence of Turkish government is penetrating the new Syrian state, harvesting their investment and the protection that was given to HTS over the last years of Bashar al-Assad.

This massive influence of Turkish ruling elites over Syria creates a big threat for the DAANES. Erdogan Neo-Otoman expansionist dreams, combined with his war against the Kurdish Liberation Movement, made the annihilation of the autonomous zone of Rojava a priority for the Turkish State. Negotiations with the new provisional government of Damascus seemed the only alternative to prevent a full scale war against Turkey. Ahmed al-Sharaa, self-appointed president of Syria, is not fond of his dependency on Turkey, and making agreements with Syrian forces reaffirms his nationalist narrative of “Syria for the Syrians”. This also comes at a time when Israel is also expanding its influence on southern Syria, expanding their “security zone” beyond the already occupied Golan highs. The rise of a new state after the collapse of a regime is always a weak time for any ruler, and he needs all alliances he can rally to consolidate his power grip. Kurdish forces are also not fond of how al-Shara is expecting to rule Syria, and all the DAANES institutions already express their deep disagreement on the new constitution proposed by the provisional government. Nevertheless, making concessions to the new proclaimed president of Syria now, can bring opportunities to ensure some autonomy for the future.

One of the key points of the agreements is the right to return of displaced population. This has direct implications for the people of Afrin, occupied by Turkish proxies on 2018, as well as the M4 highway strip between Serekaniye and Gire Spi, also occupied since 2019. As Turkish proxies are integrated in the new Syrian army, the territories they occupied are expected to follow a similar process as what is happening in Aleppo. Most fighters of this Islamist groups are themselves displaced population from all over Syria, that after the fall of the al-Assad regime are also hoping to return to their homes. This opens the door for the displaced Kurdish people of Afrin and Serekaniye to return to those historic Kurdish territories, probably under agreements of a demilitarized zone without SDF presence but with Kurdish Asayish security forces. As for now, many families from Afrin are already returning as Islamist gangs are slowly abandoning the area. Some military contingents connected to the provisional government will probably have presence in the region, but the brutalities like kidnappings, executions and looting of kurdish houses that has been taking place since the occupation of 2018 will probably not continue at the same level.

Another important point of the agreement is the recognition of Kurdish identity. Until now the official name of Syria was “Syrian Arab Republic”, excluding other minorities that lived in the country for milenia. One of the most visible aspects of this is language, with Arabic being the only one allowed in state institutions. Religious minorities had exceptions, with christian communities (like Assyrians or Armenians) being allowed to use mother tongues in their religious institutions. But for the Muslim majority of Kurdish population, no institutions were allowed to teach and use Kurdish language. The efforts of the Autonomous Administration to reorganize an education system in Kurdish has brought an extraordinary rebirth of Kurdish culture. And it is not only about scholarization, since a wide cast network of art and culture centers made possible for Kurdish language to be used also in theater or cinema, as well as kurdish dances and other traditional folklore. Literacy courses were also provided for adults that were scholarized in Arabic, making possible for them to read and write the language they spoke. This is an important victory, the new Syrian government is now forced to accept that denial of Kurdish identity in Syria is not possible anymore.

One of the big questions that remain is what will happen with the institutions of self-governance developed by the DAANES. In the agreements in Aleppo it was concluded that the local communes and councils will continue working until clear agreements are reached. The ongoing negotiations are talking about integrating the local administration institutions into the new Syrian state structure, but what does this means? Will the communes and local councils have formal authority on their neighborhoods? Will the municipal administrations of cities like Raqqa or Haseke or Qamishlo continue their work and the Syrian state will accept their autonomy? Or will they send representatives to enforce their rule under threat of arrest and military action? Will they try to dissolve the civil administrations and impose the centralized model of law and order on any nation-state? And reaching this point, those questions also extend to the armed forces. SDF is in negotiations to get integrated in the new Syrian army, with Mazlum Abdi declaring that such integration can happen only if SDF maintains autonomy and command of their areas. This aims at questioning not just the centralized authority of nation states but also to question their monopoly of violence, ensuring not only the means of self-governance but also the means of self-defense. The DAANES is willing to solve these questions on the diplomatic tables and with political means, but it’s ready to defend itself if negotiations fail and the new government attempts to impose itself by force.

From an anarchist perspective, those negotiations can be seen as a betrayal of the revolutionary principles, those same principles that brought many of us here. “We are anarchists, we don’t negotiate with the state”. But many of us have also been here enough years to learn that their political maneuvers are often well planned and calculated. Our idealism and revolutionary dreams brought us to Rojava, and here we met our Kurdish comrades not just talking about libertarian municipalism, but implementing it, and even more, being able to defend it. Maybe their ideas of democratic confederalism are not really anarchism, but maybe is just that after more than 40 years of revolutionary struggle, they have enough experiences and made enough mistakes to learned some things we may have forgotten. After decades of struggle they became more pragmatic, working to secure small victories, but not for that renouncing to the end goals of a revolutionary victory of socialism. Or maybe not, and those negotiations with the new Syrian state are just the end of the revolution. We seriously doubt it, and that’s why we decide to keep defending this revolution, because we have many things to learn from it.

Weekly Highlights 21.04.25 – 27.04.25

21.04.25 – 27.04.25

Kurdistan Conference
The DAANES and SDF have been strengthening their diplomatic position, meeting with delegations from Germany, France and US. In a major step towards Kurdish political unity, more than 400 delegates from Northern, Southern and Western Kurdistan gathered in Qamişlo for the Rojava Kurdish Unity and Common Stance Conference. The final declaration, read out by Foza Yûsif of PYD and Mihemed Ismail of ENKS affirmed “a shared view and position based on a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multicultural identity, committed to international human rights conventions, protecting women’s freedom and rights, ensuring their effective participation in political, social, and military institutions, guaranteeing the constitutional rights of the Kurds, and achieving a fair and comprehensive solution to the Kurdish issue within the framework of a united Syria.”

The following day, the new Syrian regime accused the SDF of violating the terms of the agreement between Mazlûm Abdî and Ahmed al Sharaa, by promoting federalism and establishing a de facto separate reality on the ground, against the spirit of that agreement.

Syrian-International Relations
Representatives of the new Syrian regime continue establishing ties with countries around the world. A shipment of wheat arrived in Latkiya, reportedly of Russian origin, the first shipment since the fall of the Assad regime. Al-Sharaa met with Iraqi government officials, discussing reopening the al Tanf border crossing, securing their border, the possibility of rehabilitating the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline to Syrian ports on the Mediterranean, and trade. Trucks began delivering grain to Syria from Iraq this week. South Korea & the Yemeni government will open embassies with Syria (a reversal of former Assad regime’s ties with North Korea and Houthi rebels, who ran the Yemeni embassy in Damascus under Assad). Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani raised new Syrian flag at the UN in New York. The IMF is discussing how they will “help” Syria to recover economically.

UK removed several sanctions on Syria, including Defense and Interior Ministries, following other EU and US sanctions which have been removed, but many sanctions remain in place. The US have issued 8 demands to the Al Sharaa regime in order to waive further sanctions for 2 years, including a public ban on any Palestinian political activity, proscribing the Iranian IRGC as a terrorist organisation, and allowing unilateral US military action on Syrian territory. Perhaps in a gesture towards these demands, the regime arrested 2 leaders of al Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement. However, the Syrian regime expressed disagreement over these demands as infringing on Syrian sovereignty.

Syrian Government Consolidating State Amidst Opposition Forces
In the coastal region, an Alawite force has been created under Rami Makhlouf, cousin of former dictator Bashar al-Assad; they claim to be only for protecting the people and call for international forces, especially Russia, to support them. Meanwhile a new Sunni-Jihadist group, Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, ideologically very close to IS, began carrying out killings of Alawites allegedly connected to the old regime. They do not accept the transitional government and are open to collaboration with IS; they also say they will attack the Druze in the south. In Der ez Zor countryside, attacks against SDF continue; ISIS has claimed several in the past 2 weeks, though not all.

Against this, and the fragile truces negotiated with SNA and SDF, the new regime is seeking to extend its presence throughout the country. The Interior Ministry seized a large shipment of weapons allegedly bound for Suweyda, amid operations seeking to crack down on weapon proliferation in the Druze south. In Aleppo governorate, a former commander of al Nusra Front, Abdul Rahman Salama, was appointed deputy supervisor of Afrin, Azaz, al Bab, Jarablus and Manbij, as part of the provinces plan to intensify administrative presence in the area.

Commemoration of 1915 Armenian Genocide
This week marked 110 years since the beginning of the Genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, which went on to target Syriacs, Assyrians and Chaldeans. In the forced displacement, during which around 1.5 million Armenians and up to 500,000 Syriacs, Assyrians and Chaldeans were killed, almost all of the Armenians of modern-day Turkey were force-marched hundreds of kilometers to the deserts of Syria. Many Armenians in Syria are descendents of those surivivors. Commemorations of the genocide were held in different towns and cities in North-East Syria, where the actions of modern-day Turkey in Syria and Artsakh were condemned as a continuation of the genocidal policies of the Ottoman Empire.

Reflections

The complicated tangle of overlapping interests in Syria and the region are continuing to change, as various states and bodies seek to press their advantage after the fall of Assad. The new regime in Syria is seeking to consolidate its position, amid the contradictory demands of states near and far. Iran is trying to salvage some of their tattered influence in Syria and Lebanon, but are under great pressure from the US, who simultaneously make heavy demands and not-so-discreetly threaten war. Israel is trying to prevent the emergence of a strong Syria, or the growth of Turkish influence. Turkey is trying to reach its fingers into every aspect of the newly emerging state.

The US is trying to mediate the conflicting interests of Turkey and Israel, aiming to avoid open conflict between them, while seeking to find an arrangement of the new Syria that suits them. The US seems to be supporting a large role for Turkey in the rebuilding of Syria, while trying to ease Israel’s concerns about their perceived threats. This is reflected in the Americans’ demands of the Syrian regime in exchange for sanctions relief, notably in the banning of all Palestinian factions in the country. While the new government sees this as an infringement on Syrian sovereignty, their arrest of Palestinian militia leaders suggests an amount of willingness to accomodate these demands.

In the face of all of this, al Sharaa is seeking new relations with many countries around the world, trying to get support from anyone who will give it. Their vision of sovereignty is heavily based on a strongly centralized model, and for all their claims that the new Syria will guarantee the rights of all citizens, regardless of ethnicity or confession, we know that the strongest guarantees of the rights and existence of any community are their autonomy and capacity for self-defense. The presence of DAANES and SDF at the negotiation tables today gives proof to that truth, as it is only through their assertion through self-defense and self-organization that they forced other parties to acknowledge the peoples of North East Syria and engage with them.

Of course, it is a well known tactic of imperial powers to divide their targets, to use minorities in order to divide and weaken a country, making it susceptible to their influence and aggression. Various countries in the region see a partition of Syria to their benefit, and are doing what they can to that end. The proposals of SDF and the Kurdish Liberation Movement in NES represent an alternative to such divisive tactics of imperialists and aggressors.

A truly pluralistic and confederal Syria, wherein each people takes its place with its own colour in a confederal unity, offers a hopeful path. It can bring an end to the sectarian strife so often fueled and weaponized by those powers who see in Syria only pawns for their geopolitical games and resources to plunder. It remains to be seen if al Jolani’s new regime will recognize the truth of this, or will sacrifice the Syrian peoples to foreign interests in order to secure his power.

Revolutionary greetings!